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Abstract
The global financial system experienced its first systemic crisis since the 1930s in autumn
2008, with the failure of major financial institutions in the United States and Europe and the
seizure of global credit markets. Although Hong Kong was not at the epicentre of this crisis, it was
nonetheless affected. Following an overview of Hong Kong's existing financial regulatory
framework, the article discusses the global financial crisis and its impact in Hong Kong, as well as
regulatory responses to date. From this basis, the article discusses recommendations for reforms in
Hong Kong to address weaknesses highlighted by the crisis, focusing on issues relating to Lehman
Brothers "Minibonds." The article concludes by looking forward, recommending that the crisis be
taken not only as the catalyst to resolve existing weaknesses but also to strengthen and enhance
Hong Kong's role and competitiveness as China's premier international financial centre.
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 
The global financial system experienced its first systemic crisis since the 1930s in 
autumn 2008, with the failure of major financial institutions in the United States 
and Europe and the seizure of global credit markets. Although Hong Kong was 
not at the epicentre of this crisis, it was nonetheless affected. While the global 
financial system did not collapse as the result of a series of significant 
government interventions, the full extent of the economic impact of the global 
financial crisis of 2007-2009 was nonetheless severe, resulting in the worst 
recession since the 1930s. The causes of the global financial crisis are now 
generally understood, with major initiatives underway around the world to 
restructure financial systems and economies. Reform of financial regulation has 
also been initiated, with potentially far-reaching consequences for the future of 
banking and finance.1 In looking forward, the crisis provides a unique opportunity 
for Hong Kong not only to address weaknesses highlighted by the crisis, but also 
to formulate policies in respect of its longer term role and competitiveness in the 
international financial system and to enhance its financial regulatory system. 
In this article, section II provides an overview of Hong Kong’s existing 
financial regulatory framework. Section III discusses the global financial crisis 
and its impact in Hong Kong, as well as the regulatory responses to date. Section 
IV discusses recommendations for reforms in Hong Kong to address weaknesses 
highlighted by the crisis, focusing on issues relating to Lehman Brothers 
“Minibonds”. Finally, section V looks forward, recommending that the crisis be 
taken not only as the catalyst to resolve existing weaknesses but also to strengthen 
and enhance Hong Kong’s role and competitiveness as China’s premier 
international financial centre. 
 
II.   FINANCIAL REGULATION IN HONG KONG 
 
Like other financial centres, Hong Kong’s financial regulatory system has 
developed gradually and, with some exceptions, largely in response to a range of 
financial crises, in particular major international financial crises of 1973, 1987 
and 1997. Whilst it is strong in individual sectors, gaps and overlaps remain a 
factor in Hong Kong’s regulatory system, as shown in clear relief by the fallout 
from the current global financial crisis.2 
 
                                                 
1  For detailed discussion, see D. Arner, “The Global Credit Crisis of 2008: Causes and 
Consequences” (2009) 43 Int’l Law. 91; D. Arner, P. Lejot & L. Schou-Zibell, “The Global Credit 
Crisis and Securitisation in East Asia” (2008) 3 Capital Markets Law Journal 291. 
2  For a detailed discussion of Hong Kong’s financial regulatory system, see B. Hsu et al., 
Financial Markets in Hong Kong: Law and Practice (Oxford University Press, 2006). 
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A.   Hong Kong’s Financial Regulatory System 
 
Hong Kong’s financial regulatory framework, in general, is a sectoral structure,3 
operating through a “three tier system”. Under the first tier, the Financial 
Secretary is responsible for overall policy and the Financial Services and the 
Treasury Bureau (‘FSTB’) is responsible for translating policies into regulation. 
Under the second tier, specialist regulatory agencies are responsible for regulation 
and supervision of financial services business. This tier includes the Hong Kong 
Monetary Authority (‘HKMA’ – regulating banking and banks), the Securities 
and Futures Commission (‘SFC’ – regulating the securities and futures markets), 
the Office of the Commissioner of Insurance (‘OCI’ – regulating insurance 
business), and the Mandatory Provident Fund Schemes Authority (‘MPFA’ – 
regulating the pensions industry). Under the third tier, self-regulatory 
organizations are responsible for oversight of the activities of their members, 
albeit under the supervision of the relevant specialist regulatory agency and, 
increasingly pursuant to legislation.   
In addition, other bodies also play important roles, especially the Financial 
Reporting Council (FRC – responsible for accounting and auditing standards for 
listed companies 4 ), the Companies Registry (responsible for the Companies 
Ordinance5), the Hong Kong Deposit Protection Board (‘HKDPB’ – responsible 
for Hong Kong’s deposit insurance scheme 6 ), the Independent Commission 
Against Corruption (‘ICAC’)7, the Joint Financial Intelligence Unit (‘JFIU’) and 
the Consumer Council.8 
 
1.    Hong Kong Government 
 
The Government is not involved in the day-to-day regulation of the financial 
system. Under Articles 106 to 113 of the Basic Law of Hong Kong, it is 
responsible for a range of aspects of public finance and monetary and financial 
affairs. The Financial Secretary is responsible for the monetary system, Exchange 
Fund, public finance, financial system and status of Hong Kong as an 
                                                 
3  For a discussion of financial regulatory structure, see D. Arner & J. Lin eds., Financial 
Regulation – A Guide to Structural Reform (Sweet & Maxwell, 2003). 
4 Financial Reporting Council Ordinance, Cap. 588, Laws of Hong Kong. 
5 Cap. 32, Laws of Hong Kong. The Companies Ordinance is currently in the midst of a major 
review and revision exercise under the remit of the FSTB and the Standing Committee on 
Company Law Reform (SCCLR), online: <www.cr.gov.hk/en/standing/index.htm; 
www.fstb.gov.hk/fsb/co_rewrite/eng/home/home.htm>. 
6 Deposit Protection Scheme Ordinance, Cap. 581, Laws of Hong Kong. 
7 Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201, Laws of Hong Kong.  
8 Consumer Council Ordinance, Cap. 216, Laws of Hong Kong. 
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international financial centre. 9  The FSTB implements the policies set by the 
Financial Secretary in relation to public finance, the financial system, and Hong 
Kong’s status as an international financial centre, including ensuring that Hong 
Kong’s regulatory regime is up-to-date and meets the needs of investors.  
 
2.   The HKMA: Central Banking and Banking Regulation 
    
The HKMA performs the functions of both central bank and regulator. In Hong 
Kong, the legal framework for banking is based on the Banking Ordinance10 and 
the Exchange Fund Ordinance11  supplemented by the Companies Ordinance, 
Bills of Exchange Ordinance 12  and common law. 13  This legal framework is 
further complicated by the division of authority between the HKMA and the Hong 
Kong Association of Banks (‘HKAB’).14  
Under the Exchange Fund Ordinance, the HKMA is responsible for 
administering the official monetary policy in ensuring the stability of the Hong 
Kong dollar and for managing the Exchange Fund. The HKMA manages the 
Exchange Fund under powers delegated by the Financial Secretary in accordance 
with the Exchange Fund Ordinance. 15  Its mandate is to ensure the safety, 
stability, and effectiveness of the banking system16 and to maintain the stability of 
Hong Kong’s currency by regulating the banking business, by supervising 
banking institutions, and by managing the Exchange Fund.17 The Exchange Fund 
forms the basis of Hong Kong’s linked exchange rate mechanism.18   
The HKMA also regulates all activities of “Authorized Institutions” (i.e., 
banks, restricted license banks and deposit-taking companies) under the 
framework of consolidated supervision. Under the Banking Ordinance, the 
HKMA is responsible for banking business, defined to include only deposit-
taking and cheque-related services. 19  As a result, lending business is not 
addressed by the Banking Ordinance but rather by the common law, the Money 
                                                 
9  HKSAR Chief Executive, Responsibilities of the Financial Secretary and the Secretary for 
Financial Services and the Treasury (27 June 2003); Financial Secretary, Policy Objectives in 
Financial Affairs and Public Finance (27 June 2003). 
10 Cap. 155, Laws of Hong Kong. 
11 Cap. 66, Laws of Hong Kong. 
12 Cap. 19, Laws of Hong Kong. 
13 For detailed discussion, see Hsu et al., supra note 2, c. 2. 
14 Hong Kong Association of Banks Ordinance, Cap. 364, Laws of Hong Kong. 
15 See HKSAR Chief Executive, supra note 9. 
16 Banking Ordinance, s. 7(1).  
17 Exchange Fund Ordinance, ss. 3(1) & 3(1A). 
18 The Exchange Fund was created by the Currency Ordinance of 1935, later renamed as the 
Exchange Fund Ordinance. 
19 Banking Ordinance, s. 2. 
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Lenders Ordinance20 and the rules of the HKAB. Under its rule making powers, 
most importantly, the HKAB issues the Code of Banking Practice21 with the 
endorsement of the HKMA. The Code establishes standards, enforceable by the 
HKAB, for consumer-related aspects of banking business, including terms and 
conditions, fees, use of customer information, marketing, handling of consumer 
complaints and loan recovery. 
In addition to the HKMA and HKAB, the HKDPB is responsible for the 
Hong Kong Deposit Protection Scheme (‘DPS’), both established under the 
Deposit Protection Schemes Ordinance in 2004, with the DPS commencing 
operations in 2006. Under the DPS, in which all licensed banks are required to 
participate, deposit insurance of up to HK$100,000 (in HK dollar or foreign 
currency equivalent) per depositor per member is provided with funding through 
member contributions. 
 
3.   Securities and Futures: SFC and HKEx 
 
As a result of the 1987 market crisis, the Securities Review Committee was 
commissioned to develop a plan to upgrade Hong Kong’s securities market 
infrastructure to international standards in November 1987.22 This report, known 
as the “Davison Report”, served as a blueprint for the modernization of capital 
market regulation in Hong Kong throughout the late 1980s and the 1990s.23  One 
fundamental aspect of this transformation has been the establishment of Hong 
Kong as the preferred market for mainland Chinese enterprises to raise capital. 
Following the recommendations of the Davison Report, the SFC was 
established on 1 May 1989 under the Securities and Futures Commission 
Ordinance 24  (now consolidated into the Securities and Futures Ordinance 
[‘SFO’]). Under the SFO, the SFC is the regulator of the securities and futures 
industry in Hong Kong.25 The main objectives of the SFC are to maintain and 
promote the fairness, efficiency, competitiveness, transparency and orderliness of 
the industry; provide protection to the investing public; minimize crime and 
misconduct in the industry; and reduce systemic risks in the industry.26 It has the 
statutory duties to help maintain Hong Kong’s position as an international 
                                                 
20 Cap. 163, Laws of Hong Kong. 
21 Available online:  <http://www.hkab.org.hk/PDF/rules_guidelines/code_e_2008.doc>.  
22 See generally Securities Review Committee, The Operation and Regulation of the Hong Kong 
Securities Industry: Report of the Securities Review Committee (Hong Kong Government, 1988) 
[Davison Report]. 
23 See Hsu et al., supra note 2, c. 1. 
24 Cap. 24 (now repealed). 
25 Securities and Futures Ordinance, s. 5(1). 
26 Securities and Futures Ordinance, s. 4. 
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financial centre, to facilitate innovation in financial products, and to avoid 
restrictions on competition.27 
In addition to the SFC, Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited 
(‘HKEx’) has also been vested with limited regulatory powers under the three-tier 
system. Under the Securities and Futures (Transfer of Functions – Stock 
Exchange Company Order), 28  the SFC’s functions, under the Companies 
Ordinance and the SFO, of vetting prospectuses relating to listings have been 
transferred to the HKEx. The HKEx is thus the frontline regulator of all listed and 
prospective listed companies. The SFC however remains responsible for 
supervising, monitoring, and regulating the activities of HKEx.29  
 
4.   Insurance: OCI and HKFI 
 
The legal and regulatory framework for the insurance market in Hong Kong 
comprises the Insurance Companies Ordinance,30 a statutory body called the OCI 
headed by the Insurance Authority, and self-regulatory measures. These are 
supplemented by a large body of common law. 
The OCI was established in 1992 and is the regulatory authority 
responsible for the insurance industry in Hong Kong. The OCI is headed by the 
Commissioner of Insurance, who has been appointed as the Insurance Authority 
for administering the Insurance Companies Ordinance. The main functions of the 
Insurance Authority are to authorize insurers to carry on insurance business in or 
from Hong Kong and to regulate insurers and intermediaries to ensure the 
financial soundness and integrity of the insurance market.31 While the OCI is 
responsible for regulation of insurance companies and intermediaries, securities 
activities of such firms and persons generally fall within the remit of the SFC, 
unlike the securities activities of banks.32 
The Insurance Companies Ordinance does not provide the OCI with 
statutory power to intervene in cases of disputes between policyholders and 
insurers or insurance intermediaries. The industry has a self-regulatory system 
responsible for dispute resolution. Under this system, the Insurance Claims 
Complaints Bureau (established in 1990) handles disputes involving personal 
claims against insurers on behalf of policy holders.  
                                                 
27 Securities and Futures Ordinance, s. 6. 
28 Cap. 571AE, Laws of Hong Kong. 
29 Securities and Futures Ordinance, s. 5(1)(b). 
30 Cap. 41, Laws of Hong Kong. 
31 Insurance Companies Ordinance, s. 4A. 
32  See SFC & Insurance Authority, Memorandum of Understanding between Securities and 
Futures Commission and Insurance Authority (20 December 2005). 
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In addition to the OCI, the Hong Kong Federation of Insurers, established 
in 1988, plays a key self-regulatory role in respect of insurance business in Hong 
Kong, similar in many ways to that of the HKAB in relation to banking. Most 
significantly, it is responsible for the Code of Conduct for Insurers,33 initially 
adopted in May 1999, which provides standards of insurance conduct enforceable 
by the HKFI against its membership. 
  
5.   Pensions: The MPFA 
 
The Mandatory Provident Fund Schemes Authority (‘MPFA’) is responsible for 
major pension funds regulation under the Mandatory Provident Fund Schemes 
Ordinance34 and the Occupational Retirement Schemes Ordinance35 (‘ORSO’). 
The MPFA was established in September 1998 to regulate and monitor the 
operation of privately managed provident fund schemes as mandatory retirement 
savings. The main functions of the MPFA are to ensure compliance with the 
Ordinance; register provident fund schemes and approve qualified persons as 
approved trustees; regulate the affairs and activities of approved trustees; and 
make rules or guidelines for the administration of registered schemes.36  
 
6.   Cooperation and Coordination between the Regulators 
 
Although all four regulatory agencies independently supervise their respective 
sectors, their day-to-day supervisory work is entirely independent, because a large 
number of the supervised institutions are active in banking, securities, insurance 
and/or pensions business.  
A Cross-Market Surveillance Committee (‘CMSC’), composed of 
representatives of the FSTB, HKMA, SFC, HKEx, OCI and MPFA, was 
established to exchange market information and to formulate prompt and 
appropriate actions where necessary, as well as facilitate supervision of financial 
groups. The CMSC in 2003 was reconstituted into two separate committees, the 
Financial Stability Committee and the Council of Financial Regulators. The 
Council of Financial Regulators comprises the Financial Secretary (as chair) and 
representatives from the HKMA, SFC, OCI, MPFA and FSTB. It is charged with 
contributing to the efficiency and supervision of financial institutions, promotion 
and development of Hong Kong’s financial markets and the maintenance of 
financial stability.37 In turn, the Financial Stability Committee (‘FSC’) comprises 
                                                 
33 Available online: <http://www.hkfi.org.hk/en_tips_customer_conduct.htm>.  
34 Cap. 485, Laws of Hong Kong. 
35 Cap. 426, Laws of Hong Kong. 
36 Mandatory Provident Fund Schemes Authority Ordinance, s. 6E. 
37 Council of Financial Regulators Terms of Reference.  
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the Secretary for Financial Services and the Treasury (as chair) and 
representatives from the HKMA, SFC and OCI. The FSC is charged with 
monitoring the functioning of the financial system in Hong Kong, deliberating on 
issues with possible cross-market and systemic implications and formulating and 
coordinating responses.38 
In addition to the FSC and the Council of Financial Regulators, the 
various agencies and SROs have entered into a series of Memoranda of 
Understanding (MoUs), which set out the operational framework for cooperation, 
further delineate roles and responsibilities and set out lines of communication and 
coordination. 39  The presence of so many MoUs addressing the relationships 
                                                 
38 Financial Stability Committee Terms of Reference. 
39 Financial Secretary, Letter from the Financial Secretary to the Monetary Authority, Functions 
and Responsibilities in Monetary and Financial Affairs and Monetary Policy Objective (27 June 
2003); HKMA & SFC, Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in respect of Supervision 
of Entities in Financial Groups (23 October 1995); SFC & HKMA, Memorandum of 
Understanding between the Securities and Futures Commission and the Hong Kong Monetary 
Authority (12 December 2002) [SFC-HKMA MoU]; SFC & HKMA, Memorandum of 
Understanding between the Securities and Futures Commission and the Hong Kong Monetary 
Authority (4 November 2005) (concerning the new oversight regime under the Clearing and 
Settlement Systems Ordinance); HKMA & OCI, Memorandum of Understanding between the 
Monetary Authority and the Insurance Authority (19 September 2003); HKMA & FRC, 
Memorandum of Understanding between Hong Kong Monetary Authority and Financial 
Reporting Council (19 November 2007); HKDPB, SFC & ICC, Memorandum of Understanding 
between the Hong Kong Deposit Protection Board, Securities and Futures Commission and 
Investor Compensation Company Limited (8 July 2008); SFC & Insurance Authority, 
Memorandum of Understanding between Securities and Futures Commission and Insurance 
Authority (20 December 2005); SFC & MPFA, Memorandum of Understanding concerning the 
Regulation of Mandatory Provident Fund Products (23 April 2003) (replacing an earlier MoU 
from June 1999); SFC & FRC, Memorandum of Understanding between the Securities and 
Futures Commission and the Financial Reporting Council (12 November 2007); SFC & HKEx, 
Memorandum of Understanding on matters relating to: SFC Oversight, Supervision of Exchange 
Participants, Market Surveillance (20 February 2001); SFC, HKEx & SEHK, Memorandum of 
Understanding for the Listing of Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited on the Stock 
Exchange of Hong Kong between Securities and Futures Commission, Hong Kong Exchanges and 
Clearing Limited and the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong (22 August 2001); SFC & SEHK, 
Memorandum of Understanding Governing Listing Matters (28 January 2003); SFC & HKEx, 
Agreed Interpretation of Terms in the MoU [22 August 2001] for the Purposes of the 
Commencement of the SFO (11 April 2003); MPFA & Insurance Authority, Memorandum of 
Understanding between the Mandatory Provident Fund Schemes Authority and the Insurance 
Authority (20 April 2004); Insurance Authority & FRC, Memorandum of Understanding between 
the Insurance Authority and the Financial Reporting Council (19 December 2007); Monetary 
Authority, Insurance Authority, SFC & MPFA, Memorandum of Understanding concerning the 
Regulation of MPF Intermediaries (1 January 2004) (replacing an earlier MoU from October 
1999); SEHK & FRC, Memorandum of Understanding between the Stock Exchange of Hong 
Kong and the Financial Reporting Council (27 December 2007); HKICPA & FRC, Memorandum 
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between regulatory bodies is testimony to the regulatory gaps and overlaps in the 
roles of each of the regulators and/or that their roles are inadequately delineated in 
relation to the financial marketplace as a whole. The present arrangements have 
resulted in a complex statutorily defined architecture and this contributes to a lack 
of clarity and certainty among both regulators and the financial intermediaries 
they regulate.   
 
B.   Pre-Existing Weaknesses 
 
As can be seen from this brief overview, for a jurisdiction of 7 million people, 
Hong Kong has a complicated system of financial regulation. In some cases, these 
complexities stem from piecemeal responses to previous crises and from 
accommodating (1) local consumers and businesses; (2) Hong Kong’s role as an 
international financial centre; (3) Hong Kong’s traditional role as an international 
trading port and entrepôt; and (4) starting from the late 1970s, Hong Kong’s role 
as the gateway to and from mainland China.40 At the same time, even before the 
current financial crisis, a number of weaknesses in Hong Kong’s financial system 
had been identified in the context of relationships between regulators and 
activities of a cross-sectoral nature.41 
 
1.   IMF Review 
 
In 2003, the International Monetary Fund (‘IMF’) published its review of Hong 
Kong’s financial regulatory system,42 as part of the Financial Sector Assessment 
Program (‘FSAP’), a joint IMF/World Bank project directed at improving the 
soundness of financial systems in member countries.43 It concluded that Hong 
Kong largely had an appropriate legal and regulatory framework for financial 
stability, though with some weaknesses, particularly in relation to accounting 
practices, financial conglomerates, the relationship between the SFC and HKEx 
and independence of regulatory agencies. The global financial crisis has brought 
into clearer focus certain of these issues, as well as others which were not raised 
by the IMF. Of these issues, the two most significant are the relationship between 
the HKMA and SFC in relation to the securities activities of banks, and the 
relationship between the SFC, HKEx and the Listing Rules.  
                                                                                                                                     
of Understanding between the Hong Kong Institute of  Certified Public Accountants and the 
Financial Reporting Council (20 February 2008). 
40 For a full discussion, see Hsu et al., supra note 2. 
41 Ibid. at 31. 
42  IMF, People’s Republic of China Hong Kong Special Administrative Region: Financial 
Stability Assessment (27 June 2003). 
43 For a detailed discussion, see D. Arner, Financial Stability, Economic Growth and the Role of 
Law (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), c. 2. 
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2.   Financial Conglomerates and Securities Activities of Banks: Relationship 
between the HKMA and SFC 
 
Although Hong Kong has a primarily sectoral regulatory framework, an important 
qualification to this structure concerns the activities of banks. While in the context 
of insurance and pensions activities, the HKMA retains primary authority, in the 
context of securities activities of banks the role is divided between the SFC as the 
lead regulator for the securities industry and the HKMA as the main supervisor of 
banks undertaking securities business. This anomaly has been one of the central 
points of focus in considering the problems surrounding the sale of Lehman 
Brothers Minibonds to retail investors in Hong Kong. 
 
3.   Listed Company Matters: Relationship between the SFC and HKEx  
 
As already mentioned, HKEx, via its wholly owned subsidiary the Stock 
Exchange of Hong Kong (‘SEHK’), is empowered under the SFO to make rules 
for, inter alia, applications for the listing of securities and the requirements to be 
met before securities may be listed.44 The Listing Rules have been made under 
such provisions and the SEHK is responsible for administering them.  
The Listing Rules operate on a contractual basis between the SEHK and 
the issuer and its related parties. They are not themselves laws and so do not have 
the force of law. However, the Listing Rules do enjoy a measure of statutory 
backing by virtue of the Securities and Futures (Stock Market Listing) Rules 
(‘SMLR’) which is subsidiary legislation under the SFO made by the SFC.45 The 
SMLR require an applicant for listing to comply with the Listing Rules and is 
specifically concerned with the quality of information disclosure by listed 
companies and listing applicants. Under the SMLR, companies that disseminate 
information to the public have to file a copy of the disclosure materials, including 
prospectuses and listing documents, with the SFC (the “dual filing” system).46 
Further, the SMLR provides that a company may simply authorize the SEHK to 
make the filing on its behalf. 
Any person who intentionally or recklessly provides false or misleading 
information when making a disclosure commits an offence under the SMLR,47 and 
is subject to the statutory powers of the SFC. In appropriate cases, the SFC may 
pursue action or refer to the Department of Justice to prosecute offenders. In 
                                                 
44 Securities and Futures Ordinance, s. 23. 
45 The Securities and Futures (Stock Market Listing) Rules came into effect on 1 April 2003, the 
same time as the Securities and Futures Ordinance. 
46  See Securities and Futures (Stock Market Listing) Rules, rules 3 & 5, concerning listing 
applications and other disclosures to the public. 
47 Securities and Futures (Stock Market Listing) Rules, s. 384. 
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addition, private individuals (such as shareholders) may bring an action against 
such persons in respect of false or misleading communications under section 391 
of the SFO. 
The three-tier structure relating to listing matters was the subject of an 
external review which led to the publication of a report in March 2003. 48 
Although the dual filing regime was introduced as a means to improving the 
effectiveness of enforcement as regards the disclosures of listed companies by 
providing for an increased role for the SFC as regards the quality of disclosures, 
the Expert Report was critical of the dual filing regime as: (1) “inherently 
inefficient and costly” as a result of work duplication; (2) not dealing adequately 
with instances of non-disclosure; (3) a complicated delineation of responsibility 
between the HKEx and the SFC; and (4) giving rise to the possibility of 
exacerbating frictions between the SFC and HKEx.49 
The Report recommended these issues be addressed with two primary 
changes. First, HKEx should be relieved of its listing responsibilities. This should 
instead be taken up by a new entity which the Report calls the “Hong Kong 
Listing Authority”, which would operate as part of, or under the auspices of, the 
SFC. While the Report expresses the hope that this would improve 
communication between the SFC and the HKEx, such a consequence is obviously 
far from certain. Second, the Listing Rules should receive further statutory 
backing than at present under the SMLR in order for a stronger array of statutory 
sanctions to be available to deal with instances of non-compliance. However, the 
Report considered that the Listing Rules should retain their present non-statutory 
status so as to preserve flexibility, for example, to deal with market developments. 
At present, a consultation is underway on proposed amendments to the 
SMLR.50 Under this proposal, a number of Listing Rules would be removed to 
form part of the SMLR. Such matters relate to disclosure, namely, as to price 
sensitive information, annual and periodic reports, and notifiable and connected 
transactions. While the proposal would make no substantive changes to the 
provisions, the effect of removing them would be that they cease to be contractual 
matters between the SEHK and the issuer and its related parties and would instead 
become statutory requirements. As such, this proposal has the potential to 
enhance an area of weakness in Hong Kong’s regulation of listing and public 
offerings of securities. Nonetheless, there remain strong arguments for moving the 
                                                 
48 Report by the Expert Group to Review the Operation of the Securities and Futures Market 
Regulatory Structure (March 2003) [Expert Report]. 
49 Ibid. at 13, 45 and 55. 
50 Securities and Futures Commission, “A consultation paper on proposed amendments to the 
Securities and Futures (Stock Market Listing) Rules” (January 2005); Financial Services and the 
Treasury Bureau, “Consultation paper on proposed amendments to the Securities and Futures 
Ordinance to give statutory backing to major listing requirements” (January 2005). 
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Listing Rules from the SEHK to the SFC, as has been done in the United 
Kingdom in 2000 through the transfer of authority in this regard from the London 
Stock Exchange to the Financial Services Authority. 
 
4.   Other Issues: Review of Banking Stability 
 
In July 2008, the HKMA released an external review of its work in the area of 
banking stability. 51  Overall, echoing the IMF’s conclusion, the Carse Report 
concluded:  
 
No fundamental deficiencies in the regulatory and supervisory framework 
have been identified. But a number of enhancements can be made which 
will provide an even sounder foundation to cope with the challenges 
ahead.52  
 
The report was prescient in the context of the need to review deposit protection 
arrangements53 and regulatory structure.54 It is also certainly correct in stating that 
“priorities over the next few years will be set to a large extent by the lessons 
learned internationally from the sub-prime crisis” and at the same time that “[t]he 
future agenda in Hong Kong will also be set by local considerations, including 
particularly the need to manage the increasing business integration with the 
Mainland”.55 
At the same time, the Carse Report did not anticipate the scale of problems 
which would emerge as the global financial crisis intensified and how these would 
highlight a range of particular problems beyond the context of banking stability. 
 
III.   THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS AND ITS EFFECTS IN HONG KONG 
 
Although certain problems were known to exist with financial regulation in Hong 
Kong, the global financial crisis highlighted certain of these and also brought to 
light new issues. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
51 D. Carse, Review of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority’s Work on Banking Stability (July 
2008) [Carse Report]. 
52 Ibid. at iv-v. 
53 Ibid. at 51. 
54 Ibid. at 15. 
55 Ibid. at 2. 
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A.   The Global Financial Crisis 
 
In essence, the global financial crisis of 2007-2009 resulted from an 
unprecedented period of excessive borrowing, excessive lending and excessive 
investment incentivised by a series of significant economic and regulatory factors. 
Excesses in borrowing and lending most directly arose in the context of the 
market for subprime residential mortgages in the United States, especially during 
2005 and 2006. However, over-borrowing and lending were prevalent in virtually 
all asset classes globally, including commercial real estate, corporate lending 
(especially for mergers and acquisitions and private equity transactions), 
commodities and international (especially emerging markets) equities. These 
excesses were not limited to the United States; they were truly global, impacting 
almost every market and asset class. These broad-based excesses in borrowing 
and lending were fuelled by over-investment from a wide range of investors 
around the world. 
Such borrowing, lending and investment were inextricably interconnected 
through a range of transaction structures derived from well understood techniques 
of securitization – the transmission mechanism between borrowing, lending and 
investment. Essentially, securitization is a transaction structure in which loans 
(such as loans secured by residential real estate – i.e., mortgages) are pooled 
together (“repackaged”) as collateral underlying the issuance of securities, 
predominantly debt securities. At its simplest, securitization makes a great deal of 
sense: it allows the distribution of risks to a wider pool of investors, thereby 
reducing the cost of borrowing for ultimate borrowers and reducing the risk to 
lenders of defaults on underlying loans. At the same time, however, the structure 
has the potential to provide significant incentives for abuse, including excessive 
complexity and financialization (essentially, a disassociation between financial 
and real economic activity), and this in many ways lies at the heart of the global 
financial crisis of 2007-2009. Especially in the United States, loans came to be 
made not by banks with an on-going interest in their repayment but instead by 
specialists – mortgage brokers for real estate and a range of financial institutions, 
especially investment banks, for corporate loans – intent on profiting from 
charging to arrange loans. In the extreme form of the originate and distribute 
model of finance which became common at the beginning of the 21st century, they 
had no intention of maintaining an interest in the ability of the borrower to repay 
in the future.  
Securitization was thus the central linkage between over-investment in 
credit securities and over-borrowing and lending. Excesses in investment were 
largely the result of two economic factors: first, the period of low interest rates in 
Japan in the wake of the onset of its banking crisis at the beginning of the 1990s 
and in the United States following the bursting of the dot.com bubble in 2001; and 
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second, the imbalances in saving and investment between the Anglo-American 
economies, especially the United States and United Kingdom, and the rest of the 
world, especially Japan, China and the major oil-producing countries such as 
Russia and Saudi Arabia, largely resulting from a build-up of foreign exchange 
reserves in the wake of experiences during the Asian financial crisis of 1997-
1998. The combination of low interest rates and large volumes of investment 
funds from outside the United States and the United Kingdom supported massive 
investment in debt securities in New York and London designed to produce an 
appealing combination of perceived safety and attractive yields. 
  In addition to issues which arose in the context of relatively simple 
securitization transactions, the technology of securitization was expanded over the 
past decade to encompass a range of ever-more complex techniques and 
structures, including structured investment vehicles (‘SIVs’) and conduits, 
collateralized debt obligations (‘CDOs’), collateralized loan obligations (‘CLOs’), 
synthetic securitizations and a range of other exotics such as CDO2s and synthetic 
CDOs. Many of these took the technology of securitization (pooling of portfolios 
of risks, off-balance sheet structure and capital markets funding) and combined it 
with that of over-the-counter (‘OTC’) derivatives, especially credit derivatives 
such as credit default swaps (‘CDS’). While such transaction structures in 
hindsight may seem an obvious source of risk, in fact, in the period leading up to 
the global financial crisis, such techniques received important support and 
developmental incentives from regulators around the world. This combination of 
complexity, financialization, regulatory incentives and failures, corporate 
governance and risk management failures, excessive liquidity and massive global 
investor demand set the stage for the crisis. 
Following interest rate increases in major markets, peaks in the US 
residential real estate market and resultant shifts in market sentiment, the complex 
transmission mechanisms at the heart of the financial excesses preceding the onset 
of the global financial crisis ceased to function. As a result of lack of transparency 
resulting from complexity and risk distribution, a process of adverse selection, 
loss of confidence, changes in market psychology and investor preferences 
amongst wholesale market participants combined to produce a closure of the 
primary interbank funding mechanisms in the global financial markets, eventually 
leading to the failure of significant international financial institutions around the 
world. As complexity and lack of transparency hindered market and regulatory 
responses, moral hazard and improperly designed financial infrastructure and 
regulatory systems hindered appropriate responses.  
In hindsight, it is now clear that excessive attention was placed on 
monetary policy rather than balancing monetary policy and financial stability. 
Regulatory attention focussed excessively on the safety and soundness of 
individual financial institutions rather than on systemic risks and linkages across 
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institutions and markets. Prudential regulatory and risk management systems did 
not take adequate account of market cycles and crises, and that the realities of 
potential failures of large complex financial institutions had not been adequately 
addressed in advance. 
 
B.   Impact in Hong Kong 
 
Hong Kong has not been immune from the impact of the global financial crisis. 
On 15 September 2008, Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy triggering the 
highest profile incident in Hong Kong flowing from the global financial crisis, 
though the insolvency of the firm caused less disruption to the wholesale markets 
in Hong Kong than in the other major financial centers. The near failure of 
American International Group (‘AIG’) during this time triggered a rush by 
insurance policyholders of its subsidiary AIA (HK) to redeem their policies. 
While the US Government’s effective nationalization of AIG prevented serious 
consequences in Hong Kong, had AIG actually been allowed to fail like Lehman 
Brothers, in all likelihood Hong Kong’s financial regulatory system would have 
been hard pressed to cope. 
As a consequence of market turmoil, especially the rapid decline of the 
Australian dollar against the US dollar in foreign exchange markets, CITIC 
Pacific, the Hong Kong-listed and incorporated subsidiary of the major state-
owned Mainland conglomerate CITIC, disclosed on 20 October 2008 that it had 
lost approximately HK$15.5 billion (US$2 billion) on long-dated structured 
foreign exchange option contracts derivatives popularly known as 
“accumulators”. Following the announcement, the SFC initiated a formal 
investigation.  
The bankruptcy filing of Lehman Brothers produced second order effects 
on individuals in Hong Kong, which led to popular disquiet and public protests, 
and produced lessons for effective financial regulation in Hong Kong. Both the 
SFC56 and the HKMA57 produced reports for the Financial Secretary addressing 
issues that have arisen out of the incident, which subsequently led to proposals of 
reform for which public consultation recently ended. However, before turning to 
those issues it is necessary to provide some understanding of the products 
                                                 
56 Securities and Futures Commission, Issues Raised by the Lehman Minibonds Crisis: Report to 
the Financial Secretary (December 2008) [SFC Report]. 
57  Hong Kong Monetary Authority, Report of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority on Issues 
Concerning the Distribution of Structured Products Connected to Lehman Group Companies 
(December 2008) [HKMA Report]. 
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themselves and their impact in Hong Kong resulting from Lehman Brothers’ 
failure.58 
Lehman Brothers was a leading global dealer and arranger in credit and 
interest rate products and securities. Structuring securities was important in its 
activities and the firm’s sales to retail buyers in Asia became prolific. As set out 
in the SFC’s report, these included sales to Hong Kong retail buyers of complex 
structured notes. Pacific International Finance Limited (‘PIFL’), a Cayman 
Islands-incorporated SPV issuer, 59  issued approximately HK$14 billion of 
structured products (mainly unlisted credit-linked notes) branded “Minibonds”,60 
which were unlisted debt securities arranged by a Hong Kong subsidiary of 
Lehman Brothers Holdings61 and sold through 21 licensed bank and securities 
broker distributors.62 The Minibonds were referenced to the credit of companies 
including HSBC, Hutchison Whampoa, DBS, Swire Pacific, Sun Hung Kai 
Properties, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley. A total of 32 series of Minibonds 
were issued. Lehman Brothers’ collapse triggered contractual provisions in the 
Minibond issues requiring unwinding of the underlying financial structure, 
resulting in their value falling to no more than a fraction of the amounts paid. This 
led to the following issues: 
 
1. The effectiveness of the regulation of the marketing and sale of complex 
financial instruments, particularly requirements for transaction 
information disclosure in a language clear and simple enough for ordinary 
retail investors to understand, and which enables them to make informed 
decisions. 
2. The quality of point-of-sale supervision of financial intermediaries 
serving individual investors in ensuring the understanding of front-line 
sales staff of products being sold. 
                                                 
58  For further discussion, see P. Lejot, “Dictum non meum pactum: Lehman’s minibond 
transactions,” (2009) 38 Hong Kong L.J. 585. 
59 Commonly referred to as an orphan SPV, that is not owned by or legally controlled by the 
person whose special purpose it has been established – while at the same time, that person should 
be able to rely upon the fact that, in practice, the SPV will carry out the transaction or transactions 
into which it is expected to enter in a manner which is predictable. 
60  “Retail” means buyers of financial instruments who are not professional investors or 
intermediaries and whose participation in any single issue is modest. They may be intelligent, 
clear-sighted and accustomed to buying and selling any such instruments but could not reasonably 
be seen as sophisticated. 
61 SFC report, supra note 56, s. 13 (“Impact of failure of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. on Hong 
Kong Investors”); HKMA report, supra note 57, s. 2 (“Lehman structured products”). 
62 Lehman Brothers subsidiaries were licensed by the SFC in corporate finance and securities 
advisory, and securities and futures dealing. No Lehman Brothers company has held a Hong Kong 
banking license. Lehman Brothers did not directly market or sell Minibonds to Hong Kong buyers 
although members of its staff may have assisted the sales process conducted by distributors. 
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3. Whether sales incentives encouraged distributors to mis-sell securities,63 
in particular inducing sales with incomplete or misleading information.64  
4. Whether the law ensures contractual even-handedness in the sale of 
proprietary complex financial instruments to retail and other investors.  
 
Many types of investors use complex transactions, largely as a result of 
the utility of securitization, other forms of credit risk transfer, financial 
derivatives, and a pre-crisis trend for investment barriers to be dismantled. They 
are legitimate instruments but present problems of disclosure market regulators 
are usually expected to monitor. This is a problem not only for retail users but for 
many professional intermediaries, as recent English case law and the global 
financial crisis both show.65 To be considered fair contracts, complex instruments 
must:  
 
1. Carry warnings that make clear their speculative nature; and 
2. Be supported by information sufficiently complete and well-presented to 
allow the decision of a reasonable buyer to be fairly informed.66 
 
Minibonds targeted retail customers using low nominal purchase prices of 
around US$5,000 and “gifts” of inexpensive consumer products or supermarket 
coupons. Most Minibonds were structured with underlying security assets and 
referenced to credit risks – the return on each issue was a function of yield from 
the underlying security assets plus the premium earned from time-to-time insuring 
the credit standing of specified borrowers, all well-known Chinese or 
international companies, or banks with top credit ratings.67  
                                                 
63 Lehman paid its distributors fees of as much as 5% of Minibond sale proceeds.  
64 Claims against distributors for mis-selling could also suggest misrepresentation or fraudulent 
mistake in contract formation, and infractions arising from failure to meet regulatory compliance 
requirements, e.g. in ensuring that sales staff are properly acquainted with the terms of complex 
financial products. The HKMA and SFC indicate that over 95% of complaints together received 
from Minibond holders allege point of sale mis-selling by distributors. SFC report, supra note 56 
& later HKMA & SFC notices, available online:   
<http://www.info.gov.hk/hkma/eng/press/category_f.htm>. 
65 A leading banking misrepresentation case, Peekay Intermark Limited & Another v. Australia 
and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2005] EWHC 830 (Comm), [2006] EWCA Civ 386, 
showed confusion in both arranger and buyer as to the terms and design of structured notes. 
66 This concern was raised in the context of other Hong Kong retail-targeted instruments: see P. 
Lejot, “Cover up! Hong Kong’s Regulation of Exchange-traded Warrants,” (2006) 36 Hong Kong 
L.J. 277. It would apply also to complex option-based contracts known as accumulators in the 
context of CITIC Pacific. 
67 Separate issues arranged by another bank in Hong Kong used Lehman Brothers as a reference 
entity.  
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The Minibonds were unlisted, and as such, illiquid. In the prospectus, it 
was cautioned that the arranger was under no duty to make a market, and there 
was thus no dealing price. There was also no information as to the underlying 
security assets purchased with the proceeds of the issues, meaning their value was 
unknown.  The filing for bankruptcy by the holding company of Lehman Brothers 
led to a payment default of the Minibonds, resulting in acceleration of the notes. 
The notes thus became repayable in full immediately. This set off a chain of 
events established in the documentation that were designed to essentially collapse 
the series. These required the underlying foreign exchange and interest rate swaps 
as well as credit default swaps to be unwound with the underlying asset securities 
liquidated. Given the then-prevailing market conditions, the unwinding and 
liquidation of these instruments resulted in substantial loss compared with their 
original acquisition price. In at least one of the series, the underlying securities 
assets were made up of Lehman Brothers’ notes. In some of the other series, one 
of the referenced entities was Lehman Brothers. Where instruments were 
connected with Lehman Brothers, there was almost no residual value. 
The Minibonds were structured such that the counter-parties of the 
underlying transactions, being Lehman Brothers subsidiaries, had prior claims, 
including expenses, over PIFL (the SPV) when it came to the distribution of 
residual proceeds of the unwound and liquidated instruments. This meant that the 
retail investors were last in line bar PIFL, which was nominally capitalized and 
did not have any assets of its own.  The substantial loss in value of the underlying 
transactions, the long liquidation process of Lehman Brothers and the priority 
standing of the retail investors meant that there would most likely not be any 
residue value available for distribution to the retail investors. After the conclusion 
of the whole process of liquidation, clearing out the debris from the underlying 
transactions, PIFL would turn into the empty shell it originally was before it was 
used as the conduit to course through the Minibond-related transactions. 
As described in the HKMA report,68 the practices and requirements in a 
number of overseas jurisdictions for sale of financial products to retail investors 
are more stringent than those currently in place in Hong Kong.69 Furthermore, it 
appears that at least some of the distributor institutions and their staff were 
engaged in questionable sales practices.70  
On 22 January 2009, Sun Hung Kai Investment Services voluntarily 
offered to repurchase Minibonds from its clients, after the SFC raised a number of 
                                                 
68 HKMA Report, supra note 57, s. 7 (“Overseas practices”). 
69 SFC Report, supra note 56, s. 8 (“Regime for authorising product documentation”) & s. 10 
(“Conduct requirements for persons that sell products to the Hong Kong public”); HKMA report, 
supra note 57, s. 3 (“Policies and regulations governing the sale of Lehman structured products”). 
70 SFC, “Sun Hung Kai Investment Services Ltd agrees with SFC to repurchase Minibonds from 
its clients at original value”, SFC Enforcement News (22 January 2009). 
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concerns in respect of SHK’s Minibond sales practices – the basis of an SFC 
reprimand.  A similar voluntary repurchase took place after KGI Asia was 
similarly reprimanded by the SFC.  The repurchases were completed on 2 July 
2009, with clients of both securities broker distributors having their Minibonds 
repurchased at a price equal to the principal amount invested by those clients.  
By contrast, on 22 July 2009, the SFC and HKMA came to an agreement 
with 16 banks who had distributed Minibonds to offer to repurchase the 
Minibonds at a price equal to 60 per cent of the nominal value of the original 
investment for customers below the age of 65 and at 70 per cent for those above 
that age. Customers who had reached settlement with the banks earlier would 
received ex gratia payments if they received settlement amounts less than what 
they would have received under this agreement. The distributing banks made no 
admission of liability, and furthermore, the SFC discontinued its investigations 
into the sale and distribution of Minibonds by the banks. The HKMA informed 
the banks of its intention not to take any enforcement action in relation to those 
customers who accept the offer. 
An agreement on identical terms for compensation was reached between 
the SFC and Grand Cathay Securities (Hong Kong) on 17 December 2009, 
bringing an end to investigations of all 19 Minibond distributors. 
On 23 December 2009, the SFC and HKMA also reached a resolution 
with Dah Sing Bank and Mevas Bank over the sale of Equity Index-linked Fixed 
Coupon Principal Protected Notes issued by Lehman Brothers.  The two banks 
agreed to repurchase the Notes from eligible customers at 80 per cent of the 
principal amount, a settlement that includes those customers settling earlier for 
less than 80 per cent being entitled to be brought to the same position as the 
customers eligible for repurchase offers. The SFC agreed not to take any 
enforcement action against the two banks under the Code of Conduct, and the 
HKMA has similarly agreed not to take any enforcement action. 
Finally, an agreement was reached by the SFC with Karl Thomson 
Investment Consultants on 13 January 2010, which was not a distributor but 
purchased Minibonds and sold them to 11 clients, to repurchase the Minibonds on 
the same terms as those offered by the 16 banks under the 22 July 2009 
settlement. 
In light of settlement being reached with most retail investors, 
consultations for reform already being carried out and the waning public interest, 
it is questionable what the ongoing Legislative Council inquiry into the alleged 
mis-selling of the Minibonds will now add. 
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The near-concluded saga of the Minibond fiasco highlights include: 
 
1. The legislative, regulatory and supervisory weaknesses in respect of 
proper and orderly sales of complex investment products aimed at 
protecting retail investors; 
2. The lacuna in the current system of dual supervision by the SFC and the 
HKMA of securities brokers and bank distributors respectively, in respect 
of the sale of investment products to retail investors; and 
3. The lack of a system to quickly and effective bring a resolution to 
disputes, as is clearly highlighted by the disparities in levels of settlement, 
the unwillingness of Citibank Hong Kong to come to similar settlement, 
and the Legislative Council inquiry that continues to drag on despite being 
unlikely to add anything further to the compensation arrangements already 
reached.  
 
C.   Responses to the Global Financial Crisis 
 
In addressing the financial regulatory reactions to the crisis, the Financial Stability 
Forum (now renamed and reconstituted as the Financial Stability Board [FSB] – 
of which Hong Kong is a founding member) and the Group of Twenty (‘G-20’) 
(of which China is a founding member) have been at the forefront 
internationally.71 During the initial stages of the crisis in April 2008, the FSF 
detailed major regulatory reforms to be undertaken.72 Furthermore, during the 
Group of Seven (‘G-7’) and IMF/World Bank annual meetings in October 2008, 
the FSF reaffirmed the contents of its April 2008 report and also significantly 
extended its scope. 73  Both of these reports have subsequently been largely 
integrated in the November 2008 statement of the G-20. 
On 15 November 2008, the G-20 addressed the causes of the crisis, 
committed to supporting an open global economy, and defined the actions to be 
taken in reforming financial regulation. 74  In this statement, subsequently 
reaffirmed and developed at subsequent G-20 meetings in London in April 2009 
and Pittsburgh in September 2009, the G-20 established five main principles to 
guide reforms, and gave highest priority to six areas: (1) mitigating against pro-
cyclicality in regulatory policies; (2) reviewing and aligning global accounting 
                                                 
71 For detailed discussion, see Arner, supra note 1. 
72 Financial Stability Forum, Report of the Financial Stability Forum on Enhancing Market and 
Institutional Resilience (7 April 2008). 
73 Financial Stability Forum, Report of the Financial Stability Forum on Enhancing Market and 
Institutional Resilience: Follow-up on Implementation (10 October 2008).  
74 G-20, Declaration: Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy, Washington D.C. 
(15 November 2008). 
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standards, particularly for complex securities; (3) strengthening the resilience and 
transparency of credit derivatives markets and reducing their systemic risks, by 
measures including the improvement of the infrastructure of OTC markets; (4) 
reviewing compensation practices as they relate to incentives for risk taking and 
innovation; (5) reviewing the international financial architecture; and (6) defining 
the scope of systemically important financial institutions and determining their 
appropriate regulation and oversight.  
 
D.   Responding to the Crisis in Hong Kong 
 
Following the structure outlined by the G-7 in October 2008, 75  Hong Kong 
focused its efforts in three areas: liquidity (expanding the HKMA’s liquidity 
mechanisms and most recently swap arrangements with the People’s Bank of 
China), depositor protection (blanket guarantee of deposits with AIs via the 
Exchange Fund) and capital injections.   
Further, the Chief Executive announced in his 2008-2009 Policy Address76 
the establishment of a new Task Force on Economic Challenges (‘TFEC’) to 
monitor the impact of the crisis on local and global markets and to identify 
proposals to deal with long-term issues. 77  In addition, at the request of the 
Financial Secretary, the SFC and HKMA have produced reports addressing issues 
arising from the Lehman incident, following which the Financial Secretary 
announced that Hong Kong would undertake a comprehensive review of the 
financial regulatory system to address both existing weaknesses and support long-
term competitiveness. This was followed by the submission of an Action Plan by 
the FSTB to the Legislative Council on the recommendations made in the SFC 
and HKMA’s reports on 2 February 200978. In accordance with the action plan, 
on 25 September 2009, the SFC published the Consultation Paper on Proposals to 
Enhance Protection for the Investing Public.  The consultation paper dealt with 
proposals in respect of pre-sale documentation, disclosure and other matters 
during the sales process, ongoing disclosure post-sale, and a post-sale cooling-off 
period.  Proposals in respect of the creation of an Investor Education Council and 
a Financial Services Ombudsman are to be separately consulted on by the 
Government later, whilst amendments to the SFO in respect of all unlisted 
structured products is to be separately consulted on by the SFC. 
                                                 
75 G-7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, Plan of Action, Washington D.C. (10 
October 2008). 
76 15 October 2008. 
77 See online: <http://www.fso.gov.hk/tfec/eng/index.html>. 
78 FSTB, “Action Plan on Recommendations in the Reports Prepared by the Hong Kong Monetary 
Authority and the Securities and Futures Commission on the Lehman Brothers Minibonds 
Incident”, CB(1)678/08-09(03) (2 February 2009). 
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E. Implications for International Finance and International Financial 
Centres 
 
Preventing and addressing systemic risk is the fundamental aspect of financial 
regulatory design.79 Such design requires the following elements to be addressed: 
first, a robust financial infrastructure (especially payment and settlement 
systems); second, well managed financial institutions with effective corporate 
governance and risk management systems; third, disclosure requirements 
sufficient to support market discipline; fourth, regulatory systems designed to 
reinforce management and market discipline as well as limiting and monitoring 
potential risks across all financial institutions; fifth, a lender of last resort to 
provide liquidity to financial institutions on an appropriate basis; sixth, 
mechanisms for resolving problem institutions; and seventh, mechanisms to 
protect financial services consumers in the event of financial institution failure.80 
First, in relation to infrastructure, the central weakness exposed by the 
crisis has been in relation to the current bilateral structure of OTC derivatives 
transactions.  In this context, the bilateral structure resulted in counterparty risks 
which were not adequately addressed either by market participants or regulators. 
Second, in relation to financial institution corporate governance, in contrast to the 
expectations of former U.S. Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan, 81 
financial institutions did not manage their own risks or businesses well. This is 
certainly one of the central failures in the global financial crisis. Third, disclosure 
requirements were not sufficient to support transparency and market discipline. In 
fact, systemic risks arose due to asymmetric information and understanding – 
essentially, weaknesses in transparency and disclosure. Such issues are 
characteristic of the highly complex structured products which acted as the 
transmission mechanism of the excesses preceding the crisis and adverse selection 
issues during the crisis. The activities of rating agencies exacerbated such issues 
both prior to and during the crisis.82 Fourth, in relation to prudential regulation, in 
most cases, systemic risk did not arise from areas which were the subject of 
regulatory responsibility. Rather, in most cases, risks arose primarily from 
regulatory arbitrage: exploitation of jurisdictional differences and areas which 
were largely unregulated. Examples include mortgage broker activities, off-
balance sheet activities of banks, thrifts and securities firms, hedge funds, OTC 
                                                 
79 See Arner, supra note 43. 
80 See generally ibid. For an alternate view of systemic risk, see S. Schwarcz, “Systemic Risk” 
(2008) 97 Georgetown L.J. 193. 
81 A. Greenspan, “Testimony of Dr. Alan Greenspan,” Hearing on the Financial Crisis and the 
Role of Federal Regulators, House Committee of Government Oversight and Reform (23 October 
2008).  
82 See Arner, Lejot & Schou-Zibell, supra note 1. 
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derivatives and non-traditional activities of insurance companies. In these cases, 
risks often arose from regulatory arbitrage: financial firms actively moving 
activities outside of regulated areas. In addition, such regulatory arbitrage was in 
many cases made possible by the splintering of financial regulation across a large 
number of regulators, with individual regulators usually less concerned about 
activities falling outside of the scope of their major responsibilities – an issue also 
significant in Hong Kong. Systemic risks also arose due to improperly designed 
prudential regulatory standards, especially in relation to capital, liquidity and 
leverage.  
Fifth, systemic risk arose due to the lack of appropriate mechanisms to 
deal with problems that arose from unregulated and/or unexpected sources. 
Examples include the necessity of rescuing AIG and also the lack of a mechanism 
for appropriately resolving Lehman Brothers. In particular, systems are required 
to deal not only with banks, especially those of systemic significance, but also 
mechanisms capable of dealing with non-banks and/or financial conglomerates. 
Finally, consumer protection mechanisms, such as deposit insurance, did not meet 
the realities of the domestic financial systems and had to be extended to new areas 
such as businesses and money markets, in order to prevent new forms of bank 
run-like withdrawals from core funding sources of the financial system. As noted 
in the first section, preventing and addressing systemic risk is the fundamental 
aspect of financial regulatory design. However, financial regulatory design should 
extend beyond addressing systemic risk to broader concerns of financial 
stability.83   
In looking forward, the current global financial crisis highlights the urgent 
requirement to redesign the both global and domestic financial regulatory systems 
not only to properly address systemic risk but also to support its proper 
functioning, i.e. financial stability. The plan outlined by the G-20 and being 
implemented by the FSB and others provides a significant comprehensive outline 
of the major issues which are to be addressed in this respect. At the same time, the 
plan advanced by the G-20 and being implemented by the FSB does not provide a 
significant amount of guidance in respect of the future of finance. 
 
IV.   CURRENT PROBLEMS AND EXISTING WEAKNESSES 
 
In addressing problems and weaknesses, the first step is an analysis of the 
performance of the financial, legal and regulatory system in Hong Kong in the 
context of the global financial crisis. From this basis, it will then be possible to 
discuss consequent recommendations. 
 
                                                 
83 See Arner, supra note 43. 
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A.   Evaluating the Performance of Financial Regulation in Hong Kong 
 
During the financial crisis, in the context of financial stability provided through 
prudential supervision and mechanisms to address systemic risk, Hong Kong’s 
financial regulatory system has been acknowledged as having performed better 
than most. 84  Yet, weaknesses in relation to deposit insurance and lack of 
compensation mechanisms for customers of failed insurance companies are now 
evident. However, financial stability, including prudential regulation, is not the 
only objective of financial regulation; market conduct (including disclosure and 
consumer protection) and competition are essential objectives. In these, especially 
market conduct, the weaknesses of Hong Kong’s regulatory system are clear. 
Disclosure issues surrounding CITIC Pacific, whilst currently unresolved, suggest 
Hong Kong’s most high profile weakness – the relationship between the SFC, 
HKEx and the Listing Rules – has, as a result of recent modifications, perhaps not 
been as problematic as many suspected. The availability of investor actions under 
the SFO and the implementation of the dual-filing regime appear to have resulted 
in an adequate system, albeit one that could be improved and strengthened. The 
most significant aspect is thus the performance of the regulatory system in the 
context of the Lehman Brothers Minibonds. 
 
B.   Evaluating Performance in the Context of Lehman Brothers Minibonds 
 
Two separate, related performance issues are highlighted by the Minibonds. The 
first concerns the regulation and oversight of complex transactions in terms of 
contract design, approvals for public issuance and transaction disclosure 
requirements. Second, regulatory supervision of the behaviour of intermediaries 
in point of sale matters, notably towards retail clients in the selling of products 
and aspects of mis-selling. Due to the high level of direct participation in financial 
trading of individual consumers and investors, both of these problems are of 
wider importance to the territory’s financial system.  
 
1.   Approvals for Issuance of Complex Products 
 
In most jurisdictions, the offer and sale of complex structured financial products 
to retail investors was limited by disclosure and liability frameworks. However, 
while the authorization framework in Hong Kong is also disclosure-based, it was 
insufficient – especially in potential liability for mis-selling – to prevent sales of 
complex products such as Minibonds to retail investors. The existing framework 
could arguably have been applied more rigorously to better protect the investing 
                                                 
84 IMF/FSTB, “IMF commends Government’s decisive actions to bolster financial stability.” 
IMF/FSTB Press Release (9 December 2008). 
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public’s interests. Transparency could have been improved through compliance 
with the normally applicable disclosure requirements. The information 
exemptions granted by the SFC give rise to concerns that the quality of disclosure 
was insufficient, for example, as regards Lehman Brothers as the beneficiary of 
the transactions and their primary credit risk.  
 
2.   Regulatory Supervision of Intermediary Behaviour 
 
How selling practices of intermediaries are regulated and supervised leads to a 
similar question – how the existing regulatory system operates, or should or could 
have operated. 
Once Minibonds were approved, the manner they were sold into the retail 
market has been criticized, particularly as regards: (1) the activities of banks and 
other financial intermediaries acting as distributors of the products, including 
possibly inappropriate use of customer or banking information for securities 
business and (2) the suitability of the products for particular customers. Both 
securities firms and banks are subject to the rules, codes and guidelines published 
by the SFC. The centrepiece of the codes regulating business practices is the 
SFC’s Code of Conduct.85 General Principle 4 requires intermediaries to “seek 
from its clients information about their financial situation, investment experience 
and investment objectives relevant to the services to be provided” and that 
“[h]aving regard to information about the client of which the licensed or 
registered person is or should be aware through the exercise of due diligence, the 
licensed or registered person should, when making a recommendation or 
solicitation, ensure the suitability of the recommendation or solicitation for that 
client is reasonable in all the circumstances” (emphasis added).  
 
3.   Regulatory Performance 
 
The regulatory requirements, if complied with, could have pre-empted many of 
the Minibond complaints. However, procuring compliance is not straightforward, 
and in this regard it is necessary to consider: (1) the adequacy of powers given to 
the SFC and HKMA to regulate; (2) the steps actually taken to regulate; and (3) 
effectiveness in procuring compliance.  
The SFC’s powers to approve offering documents for financial products 
being offered to the public are clear under both the SFO and the Companies 
Ordinance (under which the Minibonds were approved) and provide for an 
effective gate-keeping mechanism. How those powers were actually exercised in 
the context of Minibonds has been discussed.  
                                                 
85 SFC, Code of Conduct for Persons Licensed by or Registered with the Securities and Futures 
Commission (May 2006). 
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Both the SFC and HKMA have clear powers over intermediaries to 
supervise and enforce;86 in particular, the SFC has extensive powers87 to conduct 
investigations. In the case of banks, it is required to consult with the HKMA 
before exercising those powers. The SFC and HKMA have exercised their 
incumbent powers in issuing various codes and circulars concerning mis-selling 
and engaged in various forms of supervision. The effectiveness of such actions, 
and what hurdles or obstacles may have arisen, deserves further consideration, as 
does the effectiveness of the current means by which securities activities of banks 
are regulated.  
Reviewing the performance of the regulatory system implies an 
examination of the effectiveness of regulators and identifying problems in that 
regard. Such examination is central to the accountability mechanisms embedded 
in the regulatory architecture. 
One point arguably has not yet been fully appreciated – the fact that the 
concerns raised over the authorization and selling of Minibonds only came to light 
upon Lehman Brothers becoming insolvent, despite the large retail market for 
Minibonds. This seems to imply that it is likely other nascent product or mis-
selling issues exist in the market but which are as yet unidentified, and are thus 
problems waiting to happen. If a core feature of the regulatory model is the 
identification of problems before they materialize to prevent or mitigate them, 
then the extent to which this may not be happening reflects a clear gap in the 
regulatory net. 
 
C.    Resolving Current Problems and Addressing Existing Weaknesses: 
Lehman Brothers Minibonds 
 
As noted above, both the SFC88 and HKMA89 have produced reports identifying 
and addressing issues raised by the Minibonds incident. The recommendations 
made by the SFC and the HKMA may broadly be divided into five categories: (1) 
the regulatory regime; (2) conduct of business; (3) information and disclosure; (4) 
risk assessment in the context of both customer suitability and products; and (5) 
dispute resolution and compensation. These recommendations have been the basis 
of the recently ended public consultations by the SFC on the reforms to enhance 
investor protection and the prospectus regime.  Furthermore, the issue of the 
accountability framework is also discussed. 
 
                                                 
86 The SFC under Securities and Futures Ordinance, Parts VIII & IX, SFO; the HKMA under the 
Banking Ordinance. See also SFC-HKMA MoU, supra note 39. 
87 Under Securities and Futures Ordinance, s. 180. 
88 SFC Report, supra note 56. 
89 HKMA Report, supra note 57. 
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1.   The Regulatory Regime 
 
The HKMA recommended that the regulatory framework should be strengthened 
to take into account the growth in the volume and complexity of investment 
products sold to the retail public by banks and the change in public expectations 
and risk tolerance by investors in light of the Minibonds incident.90 It further 
recommended that all aspects of banks’ securities business (including registration, 
standard-setting, supervision, investigation and sanction) should be placed under 
the HKMA, and coordination between the HKMA and SFC be strengthened, to 
set broadly consistent standards of conduct.91 By contrast, the SFC observed that 
institutional regulation is now considered suboptimal, whilst the “Twin Peaks” 
approach separating safety and soundness from conduct of business is attracting 
more consideration. 92  The SFC thus recommends the Government consider 
whether Hong Kong’s current regulatory structure is best suited to facilitate its 
further development as an international financial centre.93 
The SFC’s recommendation, already initiated by the Financial Secretary, 
for a full regulatory review is clearly necessary (an issue discussed further below). 
It no longer makes sense in light of experience to separate securities regulation 
into two regulatory authorities: responsibility for regulation of banks’ securities 
activities should be transferred to the SFC, with the HKMA remaining as the 
prudential regulator of banks. However, the SFC has declined to address the 
broader questions raised about the regulatory regime, distinguishing between the 
debate taking place across the globe over the structural changes needed to prevent 
future financial crises and short-term steps to strengthen the regulatory regime for 
retail products. As noted above, the regulatory supervision of intermediary 
behaviour raises questions as to whether or not the regulatory system works as it 
should have, and in turn, if it had not, how it could be improved. 
 
2.   Conduct of Business 
 
The HKMA recommended that banks should be permitted to undertake securities 
business, but clearer differentiation between traditional deposit-taking activities 
and retail securities business should be ensured. Recommended measures include: 
(1) the physical segregation of banks’ retail securities business from ordinary 
banking business; (2) staff selling investment products to retail customers not be 
involved in banking business; (3) that banks make clear through signs and 
warnings the distinction between deposits and investments, particularly the risks 
                                                 
90 Ibid., Recommendation 4. 
91 Ibid., Recommendation 9. 
92 See section V infra. for a full discussion of issues relating to regulatory structure. 
93 SFC Report, supra note 56 at para. 21.3. 
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attached to the latter; (4) complete information separation between retail 
customers’ deposit and investment accounts; and (5) a prohibition on banks 
making use of deposit-related information to target and channel retail customers 
into investment activities.94 It further recommended that this segregation should 
apply to banks’ insurance and other investment activities.95 The recommendations 
are similar to the SFC’s, that the structure of banks’ securities operations should 
be reviewed to provide clear differentiation of banking from securities services.96 
Segregation should only be the starting point; ensuring that there is no 
undue reliance or influence arising out of a pre-existing bank-customer 
relationship will be difficult. Along with segregation should go strengthened 
training requirements for selling staff and liability frameworks in the legal and 
regulatory system against individuals, management and institutions to secure 
compliance and incentivize appropriate customer treatment. 
The issue remains how the apparent conflict of interest between the 
commercial/remunerative benefits paid to banks and their staff in selling 
securities and the risks assumed by investors in purchasing such securities is to be 
resolved.  In its consultation paper, the SFC has put forward a proposal that these 
commercial/remunerative benefits be disclosed during the sales process.97 The 
SFC has further proposed new eligibility criteria in respect of Issuers, Guarantors 
and as well as the collateral for structured products, and has also proposed that 
investors’ claims to collateral proceeds be accorded priority over claims of the 
counterparty.  The interaction between the regulatory regime and private rights of 
action, however, appears to remain weak, as is the link between the various Codes 
administered by the SFC and private rights of action. Whether or not this issue 
will be addressed by the proposals for a Financial Services Ombudsman remains 
to be seen. Certainly, it is arguable that such a private right would enable a better 
recovery return than rights over collateral that may have fall in value. 
Further measures that have been put forward for consultation by the SFC 
include the restriction of the use of gifts as incentives during the sales process, the 
audio recording of the sales process, and providing investors with a post-sale 
cooling-off period. 
 
3.   Information and Disclosure 
 
Appropriate market disclosure for proper risk assessment will always be the 
central consideration in public securities offerings. The appropriate level of 
                                                 
94 HKMA Report, supra note 57, Recommendation 10. 
95 Ibid., Recommendation 11. 
96 SFC Report, supra note 56 at para. 22.5. 
97  SFC, Consultation Paper on Proposals to Enhance Protection for the Investing Public 
(September 2009), Part III. 
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disclosure must be transparency to the degree that the buyer is a true willing 
buyer.  
The HKMA recommended that the policy objectives on which the 
disclosure-based system rests remain appropriate for Hong Kong, and the 
Government should reaffirm those objectives.98 Similarly, the SFC recommended 
that Hong Kong maintain the regulatory philosophy of disclosure coupled with 
conduct regulation of intermediaries, and through investor education, advise 
investors what SFC authorization of a product means.99  
While disclosure is the most appropriate basis for investor protection, its 
effectiveness is questionable – disclosure ensures neither understanding nor 
appreciation of the risk investment products represent. In respect of the 
Minibonds, the prospectuses were not helpful in the sense of disclosure that 
enabled proper assessment of risk. Even the extent of understanding of the staff of 
the distributors is questionable.  
Recommendations for reform of disclosure requirements include setting a 
single overall disclosure standard for all offering documents, enforceable against 
the persons responsible for the documents, 100  reconsidering whether the two 
public offering regimes for investment products should be retained and 
considering whether existing exemptions from SFC authorization of offering 
documents are too broad.101  These recommendations have now been incorporated 
in the SFC’s consultation on possible reforms to the prospectus regime in the 
Companies Ordinance and the offers of investments regime in the SFO. 
Further recommendations in respect of disclosure and investor education 
were made, such as “health warnings” attached to retail structured products with 
embedded derivatives or to retail derivative products generally,102 and uniform 
disclosure formats such as simple “product key facts statements” and “sales key 
facts statements” in respect of such products and other retail investment 
products. 103  The SFC makes a similar recommendation of summaries for 
structured products in no more than four pages of plain, concise, easily 
understood language, augmented by charts and diagrams,104 which should include 
key information and facilitate comparisons with other products.105   The SFC put 
forward this measure, in the form of Key Facts Statements in offering documents, 
for consultation. 106   Further disclosure enhancements proposed include the 
                                                 
98 Ibid., Recommendations 1 & 2. 
99 SFC Report, supra note 56 at paras. 24.9.1 and 24.9.2. 
100 Ibid. at paras. 25.5.1 and 25.5.2. 
101 Ibid. at paras. 25.6.1 and 25.6.2. 
102 HKMA Report, supra note 57, Recommendation 5. 
103 Ibid., Recommendation 6. 
104 SFC Report, supra note 56 at para. 26.6. 
105 Ibid. at paras. 26.6.1 and 26.6.2. 
106 SFC Consultation Paper, supra note 97, Part II. 
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enhancement of the information in offering documents and advertising guidelines, 
and ongoing disclosure requirements. 
Other disclosure recommendations included the review of the private 
placement regime, 107  and the revision of the SFC’s published guidance on 
marketing materials to ensure the materials are correct, properly balanced and not 
misleading.108 
The HKMA also recommended that public education campaigns should 
periodically be undertaken, with an emphasis on the responsibilities of investors, 
intermediaries and regulators, 109  whilst the SFC recommended an Investor 
Education Council be set up for the purposes of enhancing financial literacy.110 
As a counterpart to disclosure, education is a necessary component for promoting 
greater understanding of financial services. It remains questionable how receptive 
the public may be to such education. Academic understanding should not be 
equated with appreciation of risk. The expectation of reward, as surveyed, must 
be tempered by the fostering of public understanding that risk needs to be actively 
managed, and the importance of independent financial advice should be 
emphasized in investment and risk strategy. Proposals for the creation of an 
investor education body were put forward by the FSTB in February 2010.111 
One recommendation in respect of disclosure that does not push the onus 
back upon the investor comes from the SFC, which recommended requirements to 
ensure issuers provide relevant information for investors including changes in 
circumstances that may have a significant effect on the value of the investment,112 
and requiring intermediaries take appropriate steps to ensure this information is 
brought to the attention of investors.113 This requirement for ongoing disclosure 
was put forward for consultation by the SFC,114 with its website becoming a 
repository of information about unlisted investment products that have been 
authorized.115 The requirement of providing updates to investors is a more pro-
active approach to disclosure that should be applied more broadly. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
107 HKMA Report, supra note 57, Recommendation 8. 
108 Ibid. at para. 28.7. 
109 HKMA Report, supra note 57, Recommendation 3. 
110 SFC Report, supra note 56, at para. 38.4. 
111 FSTB, “Consultation Paper: Proposed Establishment of an Investor Education Council and a 
Financial Dispute Resolution Centre” (9 February 2010). 
112 Ibid. at para. 27.3.1. 
113 Ibid. at para. 27.3.2. 
114 SFC Consultation Paper, supra note 97, Parts II & III. 
115 Ibid. at para. 27.4. 
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4.   Risk Assessment   
 
The assessment of risk was central to the Minibond incident, particularly the 
identification of risks associated with complex products, and the scale of risks that 
investors are prepared or permitted to tolerate.  
The HKMA recommended that where the review results in a higher risk 
rating being attributed to a product, the institution should disclose this to 
customers to whom it recommended and sold the product. 116  In view of the 
criticisms of the credit ratings agencies (discussed further below), it is surprising 
the HKMA would recommend continued reliance on them. The difference 
between credit ratings for corporate debts and structured credits was a key aspect 
of the Minibonds; that “AAA” rating of assets in their marketing was misleading 
and thus led the also disclosures to be misleading. Even if (as seems probable) 
credit ratings agencies are to be regulated in future, reliance should be avoided. 
Rather, investors should be expected to undertake their own analysis but at the 
same time be able to take action (or for regulators to take action on their behalf) 
against issuers and sellers of financial products. 
Assessment is not limited to products, but extends to the risk profiling 
assessment of investors. The SFC recommended reviewing the appropriateness of 
the “professional investor” definition, the minimum asset portfolio requirement 
and assessment criteria under the Code of Conduct.117 This was put forward as 
part of its consultation paper.118   
The SFC also recommended requirements for intermediaries to adopt 
suitable criteria for characterizing investors to ensure suitability of advice and 
products for the individual investor be brought forward.119  This proposal has also 
been put forward in the consultation paper, and may prove an effective method for 
refining the classes of investors other than “professional” and non-professional.  
Its limitation may thus not be limited to unlisted derivative products alone, as was 
put forward in the consultation. 
The HKMA’s recommendations on customer risk follow their 
recommendations of segregation – that assessment of customer risk profiles be 
separated from the sales process and be carried out by non-sales staff with 
mandatory audio recording requirements. 
Given the reliance placed upon customer risk profiling, a spectrum of 
investor types, similar to the approach in the European Union under the Markets 
                                                 
116 HKMA Report, supra note 57, Recommendation 14. 
117 SFC Report, supra note 56 at para. 29.7. 
118 SFC Consultation Paper, supra note 97, Part III. 
119 Ibid. at para. 34.3. 
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in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) could be adopted.120 This would offer 
the advantage of uniform customer risk profiling between intermediaries and 
institutions, and could affect the level of independent advice required for each 
class of investor. 
 
5.   Dispute Resolution and Compensation 
 
The recommendations in this area were considerably more limited than those of 
other areas. The SFC recommended that the SFO be amended so that orders could 
be sought from the Court for breaches of the Code of Conduct.121  It further 
recommended that it be empowered to impose compensation orders as a 
disciplinary sanction. 122  This goes some way in addressing the disconnect 
between the regulatory regime and investor compensation. Further consideration 
should be given to the extension of rights to damages through civil suit for the 
contravention of the Code of Conduct. This would simplify the seeking of 
compensation, as it would be clear from the legislation what causes of action may 
exist.   
Both the HKMA and the SFC put forward the idea of an ombudsman for 
financial services – the HKMA took into account international practice and the 
desirability of having a specialized organization with powers to adjudicate or 
settle disputes between investors and intermediaries, and recommended the 
establishment of a dispute resolution mechanism for the financial industry along 
the lines of a financial services ombudsman should be considered.123 The SFC 
recommended that the Code of Conduct be amended to require client agreements 
to specify a right for clients to have their grievances resolved by a dispute 
resolution procedure and the Government should review the need for a financial 
ombudsman for dispute resolution. In light of the more rapid action taken in 
Singapore in respect of compensation,124 and the limited number of voluntary 
settlements between investors and distributors directly and without intervention 
from the regulators,125 it is clear action is necessary for present complainants and 
                                                 
120 Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on 
markets in financial instruments amending Council Directives 85/611/EEC and 93/6/EEC and 
Directive 2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council 
Directive 93/22/EEC, OJ L 145, 30.4.2004. 
121 SFC Report, supra note 56 at para. 39.4.2. 
122 Ibid. at para. 40.7. 
123 HKMA Report, supra note 57, Recommendation 19. 
124 “Singapore ruling on minibonds brings HK hope”, South China Morning Post (17 December 
2009). 
125  “Talks on US legal obstacle to buy-back of minibonds”, South China Morning Post (28 
November 2008); “Minibond deal raises pressure for more refunds”, South China Morning Post 
(24 January 2009). 
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dispute resolution and compensation in future. An overall mechanism for 
addressing consumer financial services complaints is appropriate. Reflecting these 
experiences and concerns, the FSTB released proposals in February 2010 for a 
Financial Dispute Resolution Centre to address banking and securities claims, but 
this is to operate in parallel to the existing insurance scheme.126  
Four options were open to complainants – litigation, arbitration, 
mediation, and negotiation. Litigation has in fact begun,127 but the complexity of 
the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy as well as overlapping civil law and regulatory 
regimes mean it will be some time before any court is able to come to a decision 
and even longer for a final result to emerge from any appellate process. The 
difficulties in respect of cost and timeliness of litigation in Hong Kong are further 
compounded by the more stringent standards applied to representative actions,128 
and indeed concerns over cost and timeliness led to the implementation of the 
Civil Justice Reforms in the Hong Kong courts on 2 April 2009. 
On 31 October 2008, the Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre 
(‘HKIAC’) announced its appointment as the service provider of the Lehman-
Brothers-related Investment Products Dispute Mediation and Arbitration 
Scheme.129 Arbitration is less formal than litigation, but must still follow arbitral 
rules and procedure of some form, with the notion that an arbitral award rendered 
by a third party who may be nominated for their knowledge or expertise may be 
somewhat fairer than a judgment rendered by the Court. Given the complexity of 
the issues, there may be difficulty in finding arbitrators capable of dealing with 
the interacting regimes of civil law, the bank-customer relationship, the regulatory 
regime, and the Minibonds themselves. Moreover, the similarities of arbitration 
and litigation may make it difficult for a class of complainants to arbitrate 
simultaneously, necessitating an individual, case-by-case approach which could 
be time-consuming and could produce inconsistent awards. As legal or other 
representation is not a prerequisite of arbitration, the information gap between 
distributors and complainants is potentially widened. The private nature of 
arbitration means that decisions and awards may not be disclosed, leaving 
complainants and the regulatory authorities in the dark as to reasoning and the 
range of compensation. 
Negotiation is the least formalized and probably least expensive method, 
involving direct negotiations between parties. Negotiating difficulties faced by 
                                                 
126 FSTB, supra note 111.  
127  “Illiterate minibond investor files writ”, South China Morning Post (4 December 2008); 
“Tribunal adjourns 12 cases relating to minibonds”, South China Morning Post (29 December 
2008); “Two women sue bank over minibond losses”, South China Morning Post (11 January 
2009). 
128 For further in respect of representative actions, see Rules of the High Court, Order 15, Rule 12. 
129 HKIAC, Press Release (31 October 2008). 
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Minibond complainants are clear, as they lack bargaining power and access to 
information. Some assisted negotiations have led to settlements – 60 note-holders 
received some HK$30 million in compensation with the assistance of the 
Democratic Party. 130  However these included some of the most vulnerable 
complainants – characterized as “elderly, less educated, [with] little investment 
experience and [having] invested considerable amounts of their savings,” 
involved “regulation violations” and were arguably the most abject cases for 
immediate recourse to the courts or other forms of resolution. The average 
amounts recovered by complainants was characterized as “high” but not 
disclosed. 
The scale of the Lehman Brothers Minibonds problem highlights a 
particular weakness – the capability to cope with high numbers of complainants. 
As the Law Reform Commission considers the appropriateness of class action 
suits for Hong Kong, other mechanisms need to be introduced whereby common, 
widespread complaints may be dealt with.  
A key issue that arises from the complexity of the Minibonds incident is 
whether the fact-finding process in an adversarial system or an inquisitorial 
process would be better for addressing the information imbalance. Despite the 
disparity in treatment between the settlement offered by the intermediaries as 
compared with that offered by the banks, the need to strengthen the links between 
investigations and fact-finding procedures for regulatory purposes, such as 
disciplinary actions and private rights, is illustrated by the reprimand made by the 
SFC prompting voluntary and full settlement from the two intermediaries, as well 
as the discontinuation of the investigation process eliciting a substantial 
settlement from the banks, highlighting the disconnect between the regulatory and 
civil law regimes.  It remains to be seen whether or not this disparity will lead to 
reforms to the regulatory system to ensure that such disparities will not arise 
again; save for the need to expedite the settlement process, there seems to be little 
justification for customers of the intermediaries to receive a full settlement in 
respect of the Minibonds, whilst bank customers only receive 60 or 70 per cent of 
the amount invested.  The discontinuation of the SFC’s investigations in particular 
raises the issue of whether or not the SFC is able to properly exercise its 
regulatory powers in respect of the banks, again raising the issue of 
satisfactoriness of the current regulatory regime. 
In respect of dispute resolution, however, it is clear that a complaints-
based approach dealt with by way of a multitude of individual cases will result in 
a painfully slow process that seems set to drag on for some time, but will also 
give rise to wildly varying rates of compensation, limit the transparency of the 
compensation process and introduces a high level of unpredictability. 
                                                 
130  “60 investors get HK$30m from banks on minibonds”, South China Morning Post (10 
December 2008). 
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Inconsistency in the quality of justice will not only damage Hong Kong’s 
reputation as a centre for dispute resolution, but also harm its competitiveness as a 
financial centre. 
For the purposes of compensation, a system for the identification and 
categorization of different classes of investors based upon factors relevant to the 
common complaint must be developed. In respect of the Minibonds incident, for 
example, where the common complaint is mis-selling, it would be appropriate to 
separate the complainants into different classes depending on factors such as age 
and investment experience, education level, and ability to carry out due diligence 
or access to independent financial advice. This would allow for common 
standards of compensation to be applied to various classes of investors, 
eliminating the inconsistency of the compensations derived thus far through the 
various methods. 
  
6.   Accountability Framework 
 
A fundamental element of any regulatory system is a level of independence for 
regulatory organizations in discharging their responsibilities. This independence 
must be backed by a framework of accountability for performance.131 The reports 
of the SFC and the HKMA considered above were prepared primarily for the 
purpose of facilitating Government review of the existing regulatory regime in the 
context of the Minibonds. 132  Both reports focus on the current structural 
framework. But laws and regulations must be pursued by the regulators with all 
appropriate due diligence if they are to be of any value. This is particularly 
important in the context of the central preventative objective of pre-emption or 
mitigation of problems prior to their occurrence.  
However, neither report raises any substantial question as to the internal 
operations or activities, policies and practices of either regulator.133 In the current 
examination of Hong Kong’s regulatory structure, the question is whether such a 
review ought to be engaged in. Such a review, if undertaken, may need to be 
conducted independently of the regulators themselves and would seek to establish 
how the SFC and HKMA executed their existing powers within the regulatory 
regime, and in what ways their operations, activities, policies and practices could 
be improved for future benefit. 
   
 
                                                 
131 These issues are discussed extensively in the IMF’s 2003 review, supra note 47. For general 
discussion, see Arner, supra note 43. 
132 See SFC Report, supra note 56; HKMA Report, supra note 57. 
133 An analysis of such issues was not requested in the context of the SFC and HKMA reports on 
Lehman Brothers Minibonds. 
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D.   Addressing Other Existing Weaknesses 
 
Other existing weaknesses include issues respecting financial stability, 
implementation of international standards and addressing credit ratings and credit 
rating agencies. 
 
1.   Financial Stability 
 
Hong Kong shares with Singapore an experience of the crisis that is unusual, in 
that there has been no general systemic instability or loss of confidence and no 
need for state funds for bank recapitalization. However, consumers have appeared 
to suffer losses in a material way, with Minibond holders facing losses similar to 
shareholders of large organizations such as AIG, Citigroup, Northern Rock and 
Royal Bank of Scotland. Hong Kong’s experience to date has been similar to 
those of Australia and Canada (whose financial regulatory systems are now being 
viewed as models) rather than the United States or the United Kingdom. Plainly, 
regulation of complex transactions has been deficient in Hong Kong, and 
supervision at the point of sale weak, in effect leading to lack of transaction 
transparency and increasing the risks of mis-selling. Hong Kong may be 
considered lucky in not having to face the failure of AIG thanks to the 
intervention of the US government, and it has experienced little in the way of 
direct exposure to the primary systemic financial problems which have emerged. 
In this, it largely has the HKMA to thank for not allowing the development of a 
significant shadow banking system – a characteristic shared with Canada and 
Australia. 
While Hong Kong has generally dealt appropriately with financial stability 
issues and external reviews have generally been favourable, in light of 
international experience, there is a strong argument that the HKMA, like other 
central banks around the world, should receive an explicit legislative financial 
stability mandate and that the existing FSC mechanism should receive greater 
attention and formalization. 
In considering other existing weaknesses, first are areas of specific 
concern raised by the crisis, namely deposit insurance, insurance consumer 
compensation arrangements and mechanisms for dealing with failed financial 
groups. In relation to deposit insurance, the crisis (through the run on BEA) has 
highlighted Hong Kong’s existing HK$100,000 limit is insufficient.134 The trend 
internationally appears to be towards more comprehensive coverage, the 
                                                 
134 As noted above, the Carse Report, supra note 51 at 51, recommends the need for a review of 
the system. 
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neighbourhood of HK$500,000 probably being more appropriate.135  This is a 
level reflected in current proposals from the HKDPB.136 
Second, the IMF in 2003 noted Hong Kong’s lack of a similar 
compensation mechanism in the context of insurance. The near failure of AIG and 
consequent panic has highlighted the need for such a scheme, consistent with 
deposit protection and the investor compensation arrangements. A possible 
arrangement would be a merger of the existing DPS for banks and the Investor 
Compensation Scheme (ICS) for securities, combined with a mechanism to deal 
with insurance. In this way, arrangements could be both centralized and 
consistent, particularly in the context of the failure of a financial conglomerate.137  
Third, while Hong Kong has in place an effective mechanism for 
addressing problem banks, the failure of Lehman Brothers and the near failure of 
AIG has highlighted the need for a comprehensive and consistent scheme for 
resolution of failing financial groups based upon separately capitalized 
subsidiaries138 and a broader scheme to address corporate restructuring. Such a 
system would probably make the most sense as part of overall regulatory 
restructuring – discussed further in the final section. 
Despite widespread criticism, the implementation of the dual filing regime 
appears to be an effective mechanism for the division of responsibilities relating 
to listing and listed companies between HKEx and the SFC. The effectiveness 
highlights the value in strengthening this system, with HKEx focusing on listing 
and the SFC dealing with enforcement. This system should be strengthened 
through implementation of the current proposals amending the SMLR to extend its 
scope. 
 
2.   Implementation of International Standards 
 
Hong Kong will also need to address the range of international regulatory changes 
being made in response to the global credit crisis.139 While Hong Kong has played 
a significant role in the development of international financial standards (such as 
                                                 
135 For discussion of deposit insurance, see R. Lastra & D. Arner, “Comparative Aspects of 
Depositor Protection Schemes”, in Arner & Lin, supra note 3. 
136  HKDPB, “Consultation on the Review of the Deposit Protection Scheme” (April 2009); 
“Consultation Paper: Strengthening the Operation of the Deposit Protection Scheme” (August 
2009). 
137 A similar structure has been adopted in the United Kingdom under the Financial Services & 
Markets Act 2000. At the same time however Hong Kong’s DPS does not suffer from the same 
delayed payout and shared losses systems which made the UK system particularly problematic in 
the context of Northern Rock. 
138 For development of this argument, see D. Arner & J. Norton, “Building a Framework to 
Address Failure of Complex Global Financial Institutions” (2009) 39 Hong Kong L.J. 95. 
139 The Carse Report also makes this recommendation, see supra note 51 at 1 and 10. 
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through its membership in the FSB), it will also be important to increase this 
participation. After all, despite the Minibond and other problems, its financial 
regulatory system has performed better than most, partly because of the 
experience gained from past problems. 140  In relation to implementation of 
standards, many jurisdictions are likely to follow a reactionary approach. If Hong 
Kong is able to implement international standards without stifling financial 
development and innovation, this may provide an important competitive 
advantage: the incidence of fewer problems in Hong Kong suggests that the 
regulatory response here can be less draconian than the approaches likely to be 
taken in London and New York. The emphasis of any regulatory reform should 
thus be on more effective regulation, not necessarily more regulation. 
 
3.   The Role of Credit Ratings and Credit Rating Agencies 
 
As in other jurisdictions, the use of credit ratings in Hong Kong is statutorily 
required to assist market participants to select securities for investment 
purposes,141 to identify eligible entities or debt,142 to assess the value of rated 
securities,143 and to calculate capital adequacy ratio of banking institutions.144 
Under the SFC’s current proposals, these ratings would still be used, for example, 
to determine the eligibility of issuers, guarantors and the collateral in 
collateralized structured products.145  Hong Kong imposes a regulatory regime on 
CRAs by way of recognition or approval. However, the authority to recognize or 
approve CRAs is scattered across different government agencies under various 
ordinances. The SFC and the MPFA are responsible for approving CRAs under 
the Securities and Futures (Financial Resources) Rules146 and the Mandatory 
Provident Fund Schemes Ordinance respectively.147 The Secretary for Financial 
Services and the Treasury is empowered to recognize CRAs under the Trustee 
Ordinance.148 The HKMA has a more important role: both the Inland Revenue 
                                                 
140 See L. Goodstadt, Profits, Politics and Panics – Hong Kong’s Banks and the Making of a 
Miracle Economy, 1935-1985 (Hong Kong: HKU Press, 2008). 
141 See, e.g., Mandatory Provident Fund Schemes (General) Regulation, Cap. 485A, Laws of 
Hong Kong, s. 37(2); Securities & Futures (Insurance) Rules, Cap. 571AI, Laws of Hong Kong, 
ss. 4 & 5; Trustee Ordinance, Cap. 29, Laws of Hong Kong, sch. 2. 
142 See, e.g., Mandatory Provident Fund Schemes (General) Regulation, ss. 68 & 71; Inland 
Revenue Ordinance, Cap. 112, Laws of Hong Kong, s. 14A; Securities & Futures (Financial 
Resources) Rules, Cap. 471N, Laws of Hong Kong, s. 58 (“Financial Resources Rules”). 
143 Insurance Companies (General Business) (Valuation) Regulation, Cap. 41G, Laws of Hong 
Kong, s. 4. 
144 See e.g., Banking (Capital) Rules, Cap. 155L, Laws of Hong Kong (“Capital Rules”). 
145 SFC Consultation Paper, supra note 97, Part II. 
146 Financial Resources Rules, s. 58. 
147 Mandatory Provident Fund Schemes (General) Regulation, s. 2. 
148 Sch. 2. 
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Ordinance and the Banking (Capital) Rules provide that only CRAs recognized 
by the HKMA may assign credit ratings in compliance with their statutory 
provisions.149 Although there are a number of statutory provisions in Hong Kong 
requiring credit rating, “credit rating” has not been statutorily defined. The criteria 
of recognition or approval is generally not set out, although the HKMA has 
published guidelines for recognition criteria in 2007.150 The inconsistencies in the 
current framework suggest that the regulation of CRAs in Hong Kong needs 
harmonizing and rationalizing.  
Risk assessment and management is the responsibility of financial 
institutions and investors. As the regulator of banking industry, under the Basel II 
internal ratings-based approach, the HKMA is required to supervise the internal 
rating procedure adopted by banks.151 In respect to the use of credit ratings for 
prudential regulatory purposes, the HKMA should be the dominant regulatory 
authority. In the context of regulation of use of credit ratings for other purposes 
such as investment management, regulation must be with the market conduct 
regulator – as discussed in Section V below. Assuming that the role of ratings will 
be reduced and the responsibility of investors for investment decisions increased, 
as market information and research service providers, the regulation of rating 
agencies generally, including authorization and ongoing compliance, would 
logically come under the market conduct regulator. 
 
V.   LOOKING FORWARD: ENHANCING HONG KONG’S COMPETITIVENESS 
 
Hong Kong is the only jurisdiction legally required to maintain its status as an 
international financial centre.152  It continues to rank highly in surveys of the 
perceived competitiveness of international financial centres, and according to a 
widely-circulated commercial survey commissioned by the City of London, Hong 
Kong has consistently ranked as the third or fourth most competitive international 
financial centre, behind London, New York and (in the most recent survey) 
Singapore.153 However, as highlighted by the preceding discussion and recently 
initiated by the Financial Secretary, Hong Kong needs to undertake a 
comprehensive analysis of the competitiveness and efficacy of its financial 
regulatory system, with the express objective of improving its attractiveness and 
                                                 
149 Inland Revenue Ordinance, s. 14A; Banking Ordinance, s. 4; Capital Rules. 
150 See HKMA, Supervisory Policy Manual: Supervisory Review Process, CA-G-5, Annex A; 
Recognition of External Credit Assessment Institutions. 
151 Ibid. 
152 Basic Law, Art. 109 states that the “Government […] shall provide an appropriate economic 
and legal environment for the maintenance of the status of Hong Kong as an international financial 
centre.” 
153 See Z/Yen Group Ltd., The Global Financial Centres Index, available in summary, online:  
<www.cityoflondon.gov.uk/economicresearch>. 
38
Asian Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 5 [2010], Iss. 1, Art. 8
http://www.bepress.com/asjcl/vol5/iss1/art8
DOI: 10.2202/1932-0205.1238
effectiveness as a financial centre. In accordance with the Action Plan put forward 
by the FSTB to LegCo, the initial phase for taking forward the recommendations 
made by the SFC and HKMA focused on the implementation of measures to 
improve the regulation of the sale of investment products and the business code of 
intermediaries, as well as enhancing investor education in Hong Kong.  This was 
to be followed by a review of the structure of the regulatory framework and other 
regulatory matters which would need to be implemented through primary 
legislation, including: whether or not two public offering regimes under the 
Companies Ordinance and SFO should be retained; whether a financial services 
ombudsman should be established by statute; whether it is necessary to adjust the 
regulatory framework regulating the securities business of banks; and whether a 
cross-border Investor Education Council should be established by statute. 154  
Proposals relating to the offering regime, investor education and dispute 
resolution have now all been released for consultation. 
 
A.   Financial Centre Competition and Competitiveness 
 
The main factors influencing financial centre competitiveness include 
governance, sophistication, liberalization, participation, human capital, 
information technology, and hinterland. While some of these factors are more 
amenable to government support than others, all are areas in which governments 
can enhance competitiveness.  
 The quality and incidence of governance, including legal and regulatory 
issues, appear intuitively associated with international competitiveness, whether 
measured by volume of banking or market-based transactions, or numbers of 
intermediaries choosing to locate in a centre from time-to-time. No 
comprehensive empirical analysis exists to show the extent to which legal or 
regulatory incentives may attract financial activity or cause firms to relocate their 
operations, but anecdotal evidence suggests that legal and regulatory factors have 
been responsible for certain shifts from one centre to another. Foreign confidence 
in its regulatory setting has a positive impact on competitiveness.  
 Furthermore, a number of studies on specific aspects of regulation, the 
cost of compliance or the attractions within any single centre of certain financial 
market segments, have shown that law and regulation can influence cross-border 
capital flows, choice of listing locations, and to some extent the reasons for 
intermediaries to establish a local presence. Other studies have shown that the 
perception of quality in regulatory design and enforcement has a positive impact 
                                                 
154  FSTB, “Action Plan on Recommendations in the Reports Prepared by the Hong Kong 
Monetary Authority and the Securities and Futures Commission on the Lehman Brothers 
Minibonds Incident”, CB(1)678/08-09(03), (2 February 2009). 
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on cross-border capital flows, including foreign direct investment.155 Hong Kong 
would be wrong to believe an under-regulated, libertarian approach would 
engender financial activity, and the collapse in general confidence from 2007 to 
2009 enhances the value of a regulatory regime that is seen as effective and well-
enforced. High costs may deter activity but regulatory quality and intensity in 
enforcement seems to support market development and competitiveness. 
 There is also a clear relationship between the economic/financial 
hinterland of any given financial centre and legal and governance strategies. For 
instance, economic area can be increased through the formation of national, 
regional and international economic zones. In this respect, the development of the 
European Union and especially its integrated market for wholesale finance 
highlight the potential that may exist in other regions, with specific examples 
currently in ASEAN and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).156 
In looking forward, one can identify the parameters of the competition 
between financial centres – a competition in which law and regulation play a 
central role. However, developing a competitive international financial centre 
(rather than a domestic financial centre) may conflict with other objectives, even 
in terms of competitiveness. For instance, it may be to a given country’s 
advantage to restrict certain aspects of the liberalization requisite for a successful 
international financial centre in the interests of the development of the country’s 
economy as a whole. As such, there are both benefits and costs to the competition 
between global financial centres. 
 
B.   Opportunities 
 
One area in which the crisis provides an opportunity for enhancing 
competitiveness lies in international responses to counterparty risk of OTC 
derivatives. Specifically, it may be valuable for the HKMA and HKEx to become 
associated with official or private sector efforts now under way in the United 
States and Europe to sponsor or give regulatory authorization to central 
organizations for the clearing and reporting of CDS contracts and their associated 
collateral. 157  The key weaknesses which have emerged in the context of the 
financial crisis are counterparty risk and transparency – risks that can be directly 
addressed through central counterparty and reporting arrangements. Transparency 
has become a widespread political demand since the fall of AIG, to give both 
                                                 
155 See e.g., H. Jackson & M. Roe, “Public Enforcement of Securities Laws: Resource-Based 
Evidence,” J. Fin’l Economics (forthcoming 2009). 
156 For discussion in the context of East Asia, see D. Arner, P. Lejot & W. Wang, “Assessing East 
Asian Financial Cooperation and Integration” (2010) 12 S.Y.B.I.L. 1. 
157 For discussion, see J. Kiff et al., “Credit Derivatives: Systemic Risks and Policy Options”, IMF 
Working Paper WP/09/254 (November 2009). 
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global markets and their regulators clear insight at any time into the general 
disposition of credit risk among banks and other intermediaries. At present, 
information on almost all completed global CDS trades, other than those wholly 
embedded in other transactions, is collated by the Trade Information Warehouse 
facility of US-based Depositary Trust and Clearing Corporation. This is however 
only  published weekly and in aggregate form.  
If the system is further developed with transnational regulatory sanction, 
then a single bridging facility from East Asia could be of value to users, other 
counterparties and regulators. The volume of CDS contracts sold by Asian 
counterparties is comparatively small; a new and separate local organization may 
seem to be of little value until the market develops.  Then it may be significant to 
have an Asian clearing and settlement mechanism to support development of a 
generally useful market while supporting financial stability, particularly given the 
consensus recently emerging from US and EU regulators on the lack of value to 
an enforced migration of OTC CDS trading to a central setting involving a single 
exchange counterparty for all contracts. The likely result now is at least one or 
more counterparty arrangements in both the United States and the European 
Union. As such, a natural addition would be one or more arrangements in Asia. 
Finally, Hong Kong’s competitive future largely depends on increasing its 
role as China’s global financial centre, especially in the context of yuan-
denominated transactions, a locus for cross-border fund management, and a 
supplier of transaction resources to Mainland users. In this respect, Hong Kong 
has done well so far in receiving support from the central government; related 
initiatives therefore need to continue. In the long-run, Hong Kong’s financial 
sector prosperity may depend upon the extent to which it maintains its entrepôt 
attractions as China’s barriers to cross-border transactions are steadily removed, 
including the development of Shanghai as an international financial centre by 
2020. 
 
C.   Reforming Regulatory Structure 
 
One issue bears specific mention: the overarching design and structure of the 
financial regulatory system. In the context of the financial stability issues which 
arose during the crisis, given that many issues arose from regulatory gaps 
(particularly in the supervision of intermediaries by the SFC and HKMA) and 
balkanization, the first step is to consider the system in a broad and integrated 
way. 
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1.   Options 
 
Overall, a number of lessons have emerged.158 First, countries must examine the 
advantages and disadvantages of possible change, including the risks inherent in 
the change process. Second, a number of basic structures are possible including 
the traditional sectoral model (with separate regulators for each financial sector, 
namely banking, securities and insurance, often combined with strict separation or 
holding company structures for financial conglomerates); the functional model 
(with separate regulators for each regulatory function – for example, financial 
stability, prudential, market conduct and competition regulation – catering to 
financial conglomerates and product innovation); the institutional structure (with 
separate regulators for different types of financial institutions, most typically 
adopted, as in Hong Kong, in the context of banks); and the integrated structure 
(with one or more sectors and/or functions combined in a single agency, often 
combined with a universal banking model for financial services provision).159 It 
cannot be taken for granted that any model is better than any other; this depends 
on particular circumstances of the jurisdiction.  
Under the integrated or single regulator structure, a country has a single 
financial regulator responsible for all aspects of the financial system and financial 
supervision. This model has been adopted in the United Kingdom (Financial 
Services Agency), Japan (Financial Supervisory Agency) and Singapore 
(Monetary Authority of Singapore). 160  This model works well with universal 
                                                 
158 For detailed discussion, see Arner & Lin, supra note 3. 
159 For detailed discussion of major models and their implementation in various jurisdictions, see 
ibid. This analytical division is generally used outside the United States and by the IMF. For an 
alternative framework of analysis (adopted in the United States), see G-30, The Structure of 
Financial Supervision: Approaches and Challenges in a Global Marketplace (October 2008). 
Under the G-30/U.S. framework, there are also four models: (1) functional; (2) institutional; (3) 
twin peaks; and (4) integrated. Under this framework, the “functional” model is largely equivalent 
to the more generally used “sectoral” model. The “functional” model is largely equivalent to the 
more generally used “institutional” model. The “integrated” and “twin peaks” model (discussed 
further below) are equivalent in both the U.S./G-30 and international/IMF formulations. The G-
30/U.S. framework does not have an equivalent to the international/IMF “functional” approach. 
To further complicate matters, in its recent review of regulatory reform options, the U.S. Treasury 
suggested there are four main options: (1) institutionally based functional regulation (the current 
U.S. model); (2) activities based functional regulation (a model based on regulators assigned 
specific functions within the financial system); (3) consolidated regulation (the model in the 
United Kingdom); and (4) objectives based regulation (the model in Australia). See U.S. 
Department of the Treasury, Blueprint for a Modernized Financial Regulatory Structure (March 
2008) [U.S. Treasury Blueprint] at 138-42. As a result, terminology and understanding the 
definition of that terminology used is of significant importance in this context. 
160 In the United Kingdom and Japan, the FSA is a separate agency from the central bank (Bank of 
England and Bank of Japan, respectively). In this structure, the central bank is responsible for 
monetary policy and financial stability, while the FSA is responsible for financial regulation. The 
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banking but can also work with other structures of financial intermediary 
activities and financial conglomerates.  
Under the sectoral regulation model, a country has separate regulators for 
each financial sector (typically, banking, securities and insurance). This model 
has been adopted in the majority of countries around the world, including the 
United States and China.161 This model works best with a system of strict sectoral 
separation of financial intermediary activities. It is also often used in countries 
which have adopted the financial holding company model or the parent / 
subsidiary model. It does not work well with universal banking models. The 
recent experience of the United States also highlights that it may not be ideal in 
the context of financial holding company models as well. 
Under the functional regulation model, a country has separate regulators 
for separate functions, including: (1) financial stability regulation; (2) prudential 
regulation of financial intermediary safety and soundness; (3) financial market 
conduct; and (4) competition. This model has been adopted in Australia, one of 
the developed common law countries which did not experience serious financial 
sector problems in the global financial crisis. 162  Today, financial stability 
regulation and prudential regulation are often combined in a single agency, with a 
separate agency responsible for financial market conduct (the “twin peaks” 
approach).163 This model has been adopted in the Netherlands and France and is 
                                                                                                                                     
United Kingdom has also adopted a single statutory framework for the FSA and financial 
regulation, the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. In Japan, there are separate statutes 
dealing with individual financial sectors (banking, securities, insurance etc) but administered by 
the FSA. In Singapore, the MAS combines the roles of central bank and financial regulation. The 
statutory framework in Singapore comprises individual laws for each major sector, administered 
by the MAS. 
161  China has the clearest example: People’s Bank of China (central bank), China Banking 
Regulatory Commission (CBRC, responsible for banking regulation), China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC, responsible for securities regulation) and the China Insurance Regulatory 
Commission (CIRC, responsible for insurance regulation). In the Mainland, each regulator is 
established under and responsible for a separate statutory framework, with cross-sectoral activities 
generally prohibited, though increasingly being allowed especially between banks and securities 
activities. For fuller discussion, see J. Barth et al. eds., Financial Restructuring and Reform in 
Post-WTO China (The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 2006). The U.S. regulatory system 
is exceptionally complex and this complexity and resulting overlaps and gaps in jurisdiction are 
now regarded as significant in the subprime crisis. See U.S. Treasury Blueprint, supra note 159. 
162 In Australia, the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) as the central bank is responsible for 
monetary policy and financial stability, the Australian Prudential Regulatory Agency (APRA) is 
responsible for regulating the safety and soundness of all significant financial institutions, the 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission is responsible for market conduct and financial 
product regulation, and the Australian Competition Commission is responsible for 
competition/antitrust. 
163 See M. Taylor, Twin Peaks: A Regulatory Structure for the New Century (London: Centre for 
the Study of Financial Innovation, 1995). 
43
Arner et al.: Hong Kong Financial Regulatory Reform
Published by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2010
currently being considered in the United Kingdom and was advocated by Henry 
Paulson, the previous U.S. Treasury Secretary.164 This model can work with any 
model of financial intermediary activities and financial conglomerate structure. 
Under the institutional regulation model, all activities of a given type of 
financial intermediary are regulated by one regulator, regardless of the specific 
type of activity being undertaken. This has not been adopted generally in any 
system; however, it is frequently adopted for banking regulation. The most 
common structure resulting from the special systemic risks posed by banks and 
their activities, whether financial or non-financial, cross-sectoral or not, is 
regulation by the banking regulator (usually the central bank), with the balance of 
regulatory responsibility allocated on a sectoral basis. This is the traditional 
structure which has developed in many jurisdictions, including Hong Kong.  
There is no general consensus on which model is best. The fundamental 
issue is tailoring a country’s financial regulatory structure to its own 
circumstances and especially its structure for addressing financial intermediary 
activities and financial conglomerates. The time for this discussion has come in 
Hong Kong. 
Third, there is an important relationship between regulatory structure (and 
attendant financial and human resources), financial structure (the relative 
importance of banking, insurance and capital markets and the level of financial 
development or repression) and the structure of financial institutions (e.g., strict 
separation of financial sectors versus universal banking). 
With this in mind, the second conclusion emerging is that regulatory 
structure must be designed to coincide with an economy’s financial structure.165 
There must be full coverage of the intermediaries (especially financial 
conglomerates), functions and risks inherent in a given financial system and in 
such manner that coincides with the history, culture and legal system of that 
economy. An additional risk involves financial structure and regulatory design 
(“financial and regulatory mismatch”). The risk is that a jurisdiction’s financial 
regulatory structure will not equate with the structure of its financial sector. That 
is, financial intermediaries will be organized on a basis not appropriately 
addressed by the regulatory structure. In such circumstances, it is possible that 
significant risks may develop through financial intermediary operations which are 
not supervised by the existing structure. For example, in a strict separation 
financial system, informal financial groups may develop, which in turn are not 
regulated on a group basis, but only on a sectoral institutional basis, leaving the 
financial system exposed to the risks of the “group”. It is exactly these sorts of 
risk which have been highlighted in Hong Kong. 
 
                                                 
164 See U.S. Treasury Blueprint, supra note 159. 
165 For a full discussion of financial structure, see Arner, supra note 43. 
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2.   Recommendations 
 
Against this background, reform of the existing system in Hong Kong, developed 
largely through trial and error and resulting in a confusing matrix of sectoral laws 
and agencies with many gaps and inconsistencies, should result in a more 
coherent system based upon specific objectives and well-defined roles. In other 
words, a more functional than traditional sectoral or institutional framework. Such 
a system could be similar to those adopted in Australia, the Netherlands and 
France, and presently being considered in the United States. While amalgamation 
of regulation into a single regulator may at first instance appear attractive in a 
small jurisdiction such as Hong Kong, it also would have certain disadvantages. 
Hong Kong has two highly regarded regulatory bodies (the HKMA and the SFC) 
which have generally been effective in performing their primary mandates. Any 
merger of these two well-established organizations would be problematic, in that 
one would dominate (with a consequent reduction in other functions regarded as 
less important than the dominant organization’s previous functions) or the 
integration would not succeed (with the two major pre-existing agencies working 
in parallel albeit under the aegis of a single umbrella).  
A “twin peaks” structure, building upon existing regulatory strengths 
while addressing existing weaknesses would seem preferable for Hong Kong’s 
specific circumstances. Such an approach would bring together like 
responsibilities into two main regulatory bodies, one generally responsible for 
monetary and financial stability and prudential regulation across the financial 
sector and institutions and the other responsible for consumer protection, market 
conduct and enforcement activities. The two would in turn be supported by a 
separate board responsible for compensation arrangements. 
Under this proposal, the HKMA could be responsible for monetary 
stability, financial stability, under an explicit mandate, and prudential regulation 
and supervision of all financial institutions, including banks, insurance companies 
and securities firms. Prudential regulation here specifically refers to the 
supervision of a firm’s capital, liquidity and leverage as part of the means of 
controlling systemic risk. Thus, the HKMA would, in addition to its existing 
monetary responsibilities, become the primary regulator of the safety and 
soundness of financial institutions in Hong Kong, addressing prudential concerns 
regarding financial conglomerates and other gaps. At the same time, the HKMA’s 
existing powers of intervention and management of problem financial institutions 
would be extended beyond banks to cover any systemically significant financial 
institution, with deposit, investor or insurance consumer compensation 
arrangements under a separate agency. 
As a second element, the SFC (perhaps as a renamed Financial Services 
Commission) would remain responsible for securities market conduct regulation 
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and would continue to issue and enforce codes of business practice, although it 
would no longer be responsible for prudential regulation of securities firms. 
Furthermore, it would be responsible for regulating all financial products offered 
across all sectors, including banking, insurance and pensions products, by any 
financial institution or financial services provider. Thus, all financial products and 
services would be regulated in a consistent manner. At the same time, there is 
much to be said for having the Listing Rules managed by HKEx, with its closer 
connection to the financial industry, and subject to enhanced enforcement powers 
for the SFC. This is a system which also merits application to the rules of other 
SROs. 
The OCI and MPFA would then be merged into the HKMA and SFC as 
appropriate, with prudential regulatory functions and personnel moving to the 
HKMA and market conduct regulatory functions and personnel shifting to the 
SFC/FSC. SROs would continue to be responsible for developing their various 
industry rules, but such SRO rules would be subject to regulatory approval and 
supported by regulatory enforcement authority through statutory backing, along 
the lines of a strengthened dual filing system or the UK proposals for statutory 
backing of the Banking Code. 
In addition, the HKDPB and the ICC could be merged, in order to ensure 
equivalent treatment of consumers in the context of financial institution failure, 
with compensation extended on equivalent terms beyond banking and securities to 
insurance as well. In this structure, the system would largely run along DPS/ICS 
lines and thus would require a relatively simple organizational structure. 
This reform would not only address financial stability concerns but also 
issues of regulatory competitiveness. In relation to stability concerns, the majority 
stem from gaps and inconsistencies resulting from the existing system; these 
would be addressed by a more coherent functional structure with clearly defined 
roles and responsibilities. In relation to competitiveness concerns, the proposal 
would address the major concerns, namely the complexity and expense of dealing 
with Hong Kong’s existing regulatory framework. Overall, such reform would 
therefore enhance both financial stability and competitiveness from the standpoint 
of compliance costs. At the same time, this would represent a major change which 
may not appeal to the various regulatory agencies comfortable in their roles, local 
business interests (which often prefer the complexity and opportunities for 
regulatory arbitrage and advantage it presents) or the Government, given the 
difficulties in managing the process. However, most consumers (whether 
individuals or non-local companies and financial firms) would prefer a simpler, 
clearer, more effective framework. Such a development in the regulatory 
architecture of Hong Kong would bring about meaningful benefits to consumers, 
issuers and intermediaries alike, as well as enhancing Hong Kong’s continued 
international standing as a financial centre. It remains to be seen whether such 
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comprehensive structural reform beyond the scope of the recent consultations will 
emerge. As the inquiry by the Legislative Council continues, and public interest in 
the Minibonds issue wanes, the political impetus for change that existed 12 
months ago now seems largely lost on the road to economic recovery. 
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